POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

A DIPD READER

DIPD

DANISH INSTITUTE FOR
PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

The vision of the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy is to contribute to the development of well functioning political parties and multiparty systems in a democratic culture, in support of the aspirations for freedom and human development of citizens in developing countries.

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EDITED BY

GREG POWER AND REBECCA A. SHOOT

LOCAL REALITIES – GLOBAL EXPERIENCES

A foreword from DIPD

The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy started to operate in January 2011, at the time when dramatic and unexpected events were unfolding in Tunisia and Egypt and other countries in the region. When the official opening of DIPD took place in May 2011 in the Danish Parliament, we organized a conference with keynote speakers from Egypt, to discuss how the new and hopefully more democratic dispensation could be supported by external actors – if at all.

One of the first initiatives we took was to prepare this publication. We felt that bringing together experiences and lessons learned from other transitions, with a focus on the role of political parties, might be worthwhile for both new and old stakeholders in Egypt as well as elsewhere. We also hoped that It might be a publication that could assist political parties in joint dialogues around transition processes, in an environment which would very likely also involve conflict and contestation among the parties.

Getting a firm hold on this strange creature called 'transition' is not easy. Many of us have witnessed transitions in the past, sometimes from a safe distance, sometimes more closely where we were almost 'participants' on the sideline. Chile is a case in point, which involved a large global community; South Africa was even more global, involving a strong solidarity community; and of course the transitions in former Eastern Europe engaged many political communities in then Western Europe.

What we learned among others was that the transitional journey was normally totally unpredictable. The first step would often come unannounced (and often under the radar screen even for academics and political commentators); it could an initiative by committed citizens, a proposal by well organized political parties or reforms proposed by progressive military chiefs, leading to a series of events that would result in more fundamental political transformation.

The stories and testimonies presented from different countries in this publication confirm this. They also provide us with a sense of the different national realities that shaped the transitional process.

There are many transitions to choose among, but we settled on Serbia, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia. In their contributions, the writers trace a journey aimed at building democracies and bringing people to the center of power. We accompany the political activist, the political scientist, and the political party chief on the journey they have taken, and they generously share with us the challenges, dilemmas, choices and victories that they encountered on the transition road.

Grand theories of the pre-conditions for successful transition may be both possible and useful, but we have chosen to listen to the testimonies of four unique cases, which not surprisingly also point to some of the universal truths regarding democratic transitions: the intense power struggle, the violability of the situation, the human suffering, the hope and despair.

In many parts of the world people have taken the first step towards change and set out on the troublesome journey of political transition, in most cases without a roadmap telling them where they would end, and despite obstacles set up by repressive and authoritarian systems. This was also the case in Egypt. Now, at present, the political parties in Egypt are doing their best to navigate in the hopeful but troubled waters of transition, and while their situation is unique, others have taken the journey before them, under different circumstances.

DIPD has a mandate to accompany the democratic forces and groups in their efforts to bring about democratic changes and build transparent, responsible and accountable multi-party systems, where people enjoy the rights to which they are entitled. As a companion, we hope to be a facilitator of ideas, reflections and insights of use to the first line change makers.

Our hope is that political parties in Egypt and elsewhere will feel encouraged by the journeys presented in this publication, and be inspired to take the next steps towards strengthening the democratic culture, both in the country as a whole and in the party.

Bjørn Førde, Director

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ACRONYMS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Turkey)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AP	Justice Party (Turkey)
Cope	Congress of the People Party (South Africa)
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition
DIPD	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy
DP	Democratic Party (Turkey)
DS	Democratic Party (Serbia)
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
DYP	Right Path Party (Turkey)
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FP	Virtue Party (Turkey)
GDP	Gross domestic product
Golkar	Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesia)
GSS	Civic Alliance of Serbia
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa)
IGO	Inter-governmental organisation
IRI	International Republican Institute
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDP	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NP	National Party (South Africa)
NSC	National Security Council (Turkey)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PAN	National Mandate Party (Indonesia)
PDI-P	Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle
PKB	National Awakening Party (Indonesia)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Turkey)
PFP	Progressive Federal Party (South Africa)
PRI	Institutional Revolution Party (Mexico)
RP	Welfare Party (Turkey)
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces (Egypt)
SNS	Serbian Progressive Party
SP	Felicity Party (SP)
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)
UDF	United Democratic Front (South Africa)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

" The period of transition provides the most extreme stress test of political parties' internal structures and of their ability to respond to the concerns of voters. Although the political dynamics will vary from country to country, managing these sorts of tensions is an issue for all political parties."

THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION

An introduction

BY GREG POWER AND REBECCA A. SHOOT

The massive political upheaval within the Middle East and North Africa since the start of 2011 has brought new levels of interest in how countries transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy.

The suddenness, speed and scale of that change has made analysis particularly difficult, as does the fact it occurred in a region almost entirely untouched by democracy.

As recently as 2010 the prospects of meaningful change appeared extremely poor, with the *Journal of Democracy* that year publishing an article under the searching title, 'Why are there no Arab democracies?'

Most academics and analysts have been more concerned with finding reasons for the 'Arab exceptionalism' that had prevented democratic politics from taking root, almost assuming the inevitability of stasis in the region.

FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY

Events since have overturned many long-held assumptions about the Middle East's capacity for representative politics. Where the region's politics were once conditioned by deadening certainty, they are now more characterised by fluidity, fluctuation and unpredictability. Descriptions such as the *Arab Awakening* provide useful shorthand, but do not capture the diversity of experience and expectation that exists amongst the people of the region. The wave of protest touched many states, and most obviously resulted in the removal of entrenched autocratic leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Yet the subsequent trajectories in these four countries emphasise the extent to which the process of transition is determined by specific local and contextual factors.

The widely recognised danger is that the overthrow of an authoritarian regime does not mean that democracy is inevitable. Although a country such as Egypt is clearly in transition, it is by no means clear *what* it is transitioning to. The challenge for analysts, political practitioners and international agencies keen to foster the spread of democracy is to draw out the critical lessons from these experiences. The distinctiveness of each country's experience means that there are no templates for political change. Rather, the most useful insights are likely to come from understanding the factors that shape political behaviour and the way in which people, political actors and institutions interact with one another in the establishment of the new system.

In this process, political parties are key. They provide the principal bodies for representing and articulating public concerns, and will be central to the negotiation of new political structures. Their organisation and effectiveness will go a long way to determining the dominant political culture, and provide the basis upon which different sections of society engage with each other. In short, the performance of the political parties will be critical in the establishment of the quality and durability of the new political settlement.

Political parties play a – perhaps the – pivotal role in providing the vehicles to mediate between different shades political opinion, aggregate public opinion, and provide policy alternatives for governing. As the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) has noted, parties "articulate visions of how society should be shaped and how resources should be utilised."[1] Yet, in many parts of the world, political parties are in a troubled state. They tend to be amongst the least trusted institutions, often plagued by perceptions of corruption, and vulnerable to the suspicion that they are guided more by the pursuit of power than ideology or principle. The performance of the party system itself often reinforces a sense of public disillusion and emerging democracies tend to suffer either from a fragmentation of political parties, which hampers effective government, or dominance by one party which excludes a wide range of opinion. At the same time, the relevance of political parties is being challenged by new forms of political activism that allow individuals to articulate their support for single issues rather than having to buy into a platform of policies which characterise political party representation.

Political parties are not only essential; they are inevitable. As Thomas Carothers has suggested,

> *"If the political choices presented to citizens were merely a scattering of individuals not organised in groups, it is hard to imagine how a government made up of such non-associated individuals would function coherently. If the political choices were ordered in groups, it is hard to see how these groups would not quickly take on the characteristics of parties once they started competing for power, including the various familiar negative attributes, such as self-interest, corruption, and combative rivalries"[2]*

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1   DIPD (2011) "Strategy 2011-2013: Political Parties in a Democratic Culture" (Co-penhagen: Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy).

2   Carothers, T., (2006) *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies,* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

And, although citizens may not be particularly endeared to political parties, they do recognise the role that they perform. For example, in a region that has experienced considerable political upheaval in recent decades, the 2011 *Latinobarometro* poll showed that across 18 countries, 58 per cent of the public now believes that democracy would be impossible without political parties.

Political parties play a particularly important role during the transition and consolidation phases of the democratic cycle. During these periods, political parties have to make the system work and start to deliver on some of the expectations that the public has invested in them. In the early phases of transition, citizen expectations of parties and politicians are exceptionally high. Yet, it is also at this point when political parties are least equipped to respond to these expectations. At this stage, parties are often poorly-rooted in the societies they seek to represent, equipped with few resources, and faced with a multiplicity of tasks involved in solidifying their internal structures and policy platforms; establishing their membership, campaigning and representative machinery; and distinguishing themselves from other political parties in the public mind. Faced with such pressures, parties are likely to fall short of popular expectations.

The period of transition provides the most extreme stress test of political parties' internal structures and of their ability to respond to the concerns of voters. Although the political dynamics will vary from country to country, managing these sorts of tensions is an issue for all political parties. The purpose of this publication is to draw on the first hand experiences of political practitioners and analysts engaged in the process of transition in their respective countries. It hopes to offers insights rather than guidance, as every political transition is different, and in a publication of this length we can only chip away at the surface of such huge political issues. The chapters are therefore built around the deliberately personal, and thus sometimes tendentious, perspective of our authors.

THE PURPOSE OF THE PUBLICATION

The intention of the publication is thus not to provide a balanced and academic dissection of democratic transition, but to examine the practical and political issues which determined the trajectory in individual states, and the part that political parties played in that process. Each of the chapters seeks to explain the politics of transition from that personal perspective, and draw out some of the key lessons.

The experience of our authors suggests that political parties face three sets of challenges in terms of analysis, strategy and organisation. First, parties need enough political sophistication to understand the process of transition, recognising both threats and opportunities, and anticipating the dilemmas that are likely to arise and the battles that they will need to fight during that process. Second, parties need both strategy and tactics. Their strategy should provide a clear vision of what needs to be achieved, and establish the principles which guide the party membership as a whole, but they should also have enough tactical awareness to recognise when negotiation and compromise are the best course of action. Third, parties need to be sufficiently well-organised to seize the opportunities when they arise. Political parties owe it to their supporters and members to both efficient and effective.

The publication starts with an introductory chapter from Genaro Arriagada, which provides an overview of the transition process, and the role of political parties, from the perspective of Latin America. This prologue draws on his personal experience, not only in his native Chile, but gleaned through his travels and observations of the transitions of Spain, Portugal, and the former Yugoslavia.

Suat Kiniklioğlu's chapter then describes the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from banned opposition movement to the dominant force in contemporary Turkish politics, recounting his own career alongside his party's ascendance to power.

The third chapter, by Kevin Evans, examines the process of transition in Indonesia after the 32-year rule of President Suharto, particularly highlighting the disengagement of the military from the political sphere and the process of building a political culture that involved 'learning to negotiate as democratic citizens'.

Chapter four, by Branimir Kuzmanović, explores the challenges of creating, mobilising and campaigning as a political party in Serbia, drawing on his role within the Democratic Party (DS) during the years of transition from Milošević's despotic rule through to the party's consolidation as a significant political player.

In the final case study, Tom Lodge assesses the state of democracy in South Africa, the development of the African National Congress (ANC), and the way in which negotiations between the political party and the then-governing National Party proceeded over a period of years.

All of the chapters provide a broad overview of their respective countries' process of political change, but the value of these contributions lies more in the analysis offered of political parties' organisation, strategy and tactics during these periods. The fluidity and uncertainty that characterises transitional periods presents distinct challenges and opportunities, and these chapters identify how the political actors interpreted, responded to and therefore sought to shape events to their advantage. The chapters highlight the distinctiveness of each country's experience, but four themes emerge that reflect the common, often very practical challenges for parties of building a political organisation, establishing constructive dialogue between political parties, negotiating space for democratic politics, and responding to and shaping voter expectations.

THE POLITICS OF ORGANISATION

The most immediate challenge facing all new political parties is simply one of organisation. Creating a political party involves establishing a number of different structures and processes. New parties will often evolve out of social or protest movements, and are often populated by well-meaning and passionate activists, who may nonetheless lack political experience. In addition, new political parties will have few, if any, resources to conduct any sort of election campaigning, and the process of building the party structures and membership, will usually run alongside a constant effort to raise funds.

In Branimir Kuzmanović's chapter on Serbia, he describes how, in its early years, the DS was motivated, but incapable of even efficiently organising any internal meetings. The result was that it was largely ineffective as a representative or campaigning organisation – the party put forward 250 candidates in 1990, but won only seven seats. As he puts it, having good candidates is never enough; they need to be presented in the right way. However, the party learned from its mistakes, became more politically astute in its campaigning, and, crucially, used its local membership as way of understanding public opinion and testing policies. Suat Kiniklioğlu makes a similar point about the Turkish AKP, emphasising the importance of the local party apparatus in providing an understanding of the issues critical to winning a national campaign.

In South Africa, the ANC was arguably much better prepared for the demands of democracy. As Tom Lodge points out, it had been the recipient of large donations, and its approach to campaigning was based on sophisticated polling and messaging techniques. But the party was also at an advantage because of its history and experience under apartheid. It had a large membership and borrowed from the Communist Party's principle of 'democratic centralism', whereby decisions were only taken after internal debate, but once taken, were binding on all members. As a result, the party showed an impressive ability both to mobilise a large number of supporters and to restrain them from deviating from the ANC line.

Common to all three examples is the emphasis placed on the need for a broad-based membership that constitutes the roots of the organisation throughout the

country; this can be the key asset during election campaigns and a transmission mechanism for public opinion to the party's policymakers. Nothing can replace canvassing and contacting voters face-to-face as a means to convince them to go out to vote. But this needs to be allied with an understanding of how to use the media as part of the campaign to present a simple message through numerous communication channels.

The period of transition will enforce change on political parties, old and new, in terms of organisation and outlook. But the key lesson appears to be that if parties are to build their membership and broaden their appeal, they firstly owe it to their supporters to be both efficient and effective, otherwise those supporters will go elsewhere.

ESTABLISHING MULTI-PARTY DIALOGUE

Following from the issue of internal party organisation is the related question of how different parties interact with one another in the emerging political sphere. Political parties have a critical role in fostering the creation of a system which encourages dialogue and interaction. The chapters suggest two dimensions to this: first, in creating a dominant political culture which promotes discourse and debate; and second, in establishing political structures that are deemed to be legitimate and fair, and that provide an opportunity for all sectors of political opinion to be aired.

The role of political parties in that phase is highlighted by Larry Diamond's definition of consolidation, which he explains as:

> *"The process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society ... [when] the norms, procedures, and expectations of democracy become so internalised that actors routinely, instinctively conform to the written (and unwritten) rules of the game ... [it] can thus only be fully understood as encompassing a shift in political culture."*[3]

The tone of political discussion will be determined by the way in which parties engage with each other. But the shift from authoritarian regime to a more democratic rule is likely to reveal many tensions between social and political forces that would previously have been suppressed. Ruling strategies have typically sought to marginalise any opposition to the regime, often portraying such opponents as enemies of the state. In such an environment, political discourse is limited, if it exists at all, and thus, there are few cultural norms to guide how different political forces should engage with one another. It is unsurprising that relations between political parties can be characterised by suspicion, antagonism and occasionally violence.

During the early years of transition in Indonesia, for example, there was an outbreak of regional and communal conflict, where seemingly minor disputes between individuals from different backgrounds (be they religious, ethnic, or regional) degenerated into wider conflicts lasting months or years. As Kevin Evans notes, under authoritarian rule, individuals looked to their leaders to settle such arguments. Transition involves people learning to interact with each other on a different basis and that negotiation and compromise do not constitute weakness, but rather represent a healthy part of living in a democracy. And, from the perspective of parties themselves, that dialogue will often result in different political actors recognising the extent to which they have common objectives, and are more likely to achieve them by collaboration as opposed to outright hostility.

Political parties also need to actively promote those principles, both in the way that they engage with each other, and by creating the political system in which they are manifested. In South Africa, despite the overwhelming dominance of the ANC, the

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3   Ash, T.G. (1990) *The Magic Lantern* (New York: Random House).

early years of President Mandela's rule were characterised by constructive engagement with all political forces. The party political system was largely inherited, included a well-organised opposition and was built on general agreement about who belonged to the nation: all South Africans agreed that they were each other's compatriots.

That dynamic has changed since 1994, and many of the ANC leaders are now contemptuously dismissive of their political opponents; this partially reflects the consolidation of the political system. As Lodge notes, even where a single party dominates the political system, if citizens believe that electoral success is the result of a fair process, the new institutions will enjoy a period of stability and parties can begin to internalise and commit themselves to democratic norms and procedures.

NEGOTIATING THE SPACE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

In most countries, the transitional period is likely to involve a long interval of negotiation between the previous regime and the insurgent social and political forces. As Genaro Arriagada succinctly points out, transitions are not single moments in time, but tortuous processes of negotiation, during which the fortunes of either side are likely to wax and wane, and which often involve compromises that ultimately please no one, but are deemed essential. The content of those negotiations will turn on how far the balance of power between the institutions of state will shift, and therefore determine how much space is created for democratic politics to flourish.

Frequently, authoritarian regimes have used the armed forces as a key element in their ruling strategies, so that the military's remit usually runs far beyond its traditional role and into intelligence, civil order, the judiciary and the political domain. For political parties to operate, they need first to create the space within which they can act, which in turn means negotiating the armed forces out of the political sphere. By their very presence, political parties present the military with a threat. Parties derive their legitimacy from popular support and will seek greater scrutiny and accountability from the armed forces. But to make that popular support mean anything, parties must first wrest political decision-making power from the armed forces in key policy areas.

Evans comments that in Indonesia, getting the armed forces to return to the barracks meant building the barracks in the first place, as the military had always been out in the community and present as an overt and obvious political force. In Turkey, Kiniklioğlu describes how the 'deep state', of which the military is one part, continued to influence and manipulate the political sphere during the period of transition – directly and deliberately undermining particular political parties and politicians. Arriagada emphasises how far the corporate interests of the armed forces reach – and the wealth that they were able to build up as a result – in many countries. And Lodge notes that, even in South Africa, Nelson Mandela was worried about the loyalty of the army to the new regime in 1995.

In each of these cases, negotiation between political actors and the military was a key element of the process of transition. But all the authors emphasise that the military has to believe that it is in its ultimate long-term interest to withdraw from the political sphere, and subject itself to democratic control. In Indonesia, this willingness to compromise was partly due to the military's recognition of its fading role in the political sphere; in Turkey, it was to do with declining public confidence in the armed forces. But as Evans notes, the point is that the military has to willingly disengage – a unilateral withdrawal could just as easily result in a unilateral decision to re-enter the political sphere.

All of the authors stress the importance of genuine compromise as part of that process of negotiation. This is often as new to the political parties as it is to their military interlocutors. Whether it is the armed forces or other elements of the outgoing regime, they need to be provided with encouragement and incentives to accept an expanded democratic political space and less direct control.

Lodge suggests that incumbents need to be rewarded for giving up power. This might involve a decision to pursue truth and reconciliation rather than to prosecute previous leaders for human rights abuses, an interim power-sharing agreement or the insurgent forces dropping some of their original demands. But he also notes that the ANC was helped by their trade union experience, and a degree of constructive ambiguity in the negotiations. He and Evans emphasise the need to allow all sides to claim some sort of victory – entirely undermining your opponent will undermine any agreement. As Lodge puts it, strong leaders make strong settlements.

REPRESENTATION AND DELIVERY

Ultimately, the long-term success of political parties depends on what they do in between election campaigns rather than during them. The final theme faced by political parties in each of the case studies is how the parties themselves make the transition from a protest or campaigning body into one that can respond to and deliver on the expectations of voters. In each case, this process is depicted as a dawning realisation during the transition period, as the excitement of the overthrow of the previous regime is replaced by the more mundane business of representing and governing.

Both Kiniklioğlu and Kuzmanović highlight how conversations with voters emphasised to them how people were more interested in issues which had a direct and tangible impact on their lives than issues of high principle or ideology. In Turkey, Kiniklioğlu tells of how one of his local campaign events was interrupted by a man who wanted to know what would happen to the wall next to his building. For this voter, fixing the wall was far more important than the quality of democracy. The threat of the deep state and the other national issues Kiniklioğlu had highlighted in his remarks were, quite simply, secondary.

Similarly, Kuzmanović notes that while people had overthrown dictatorship in the hope of a better life, the arrival of democracy did not automatically improve anyone's social or economic welfare. He stresses the importance of parties' focusing on the core issues that people care about, but also of the need for parties to establish mechanisms to understand and to respond to voters concerns. He describes how, at the local level, the initiative for more than 50 per cent of the policies implemented came from citizens themselves, and as he recalls, when their own ideas come to life those voters become the most powerful advocates for those initiatives – and for the party. That responsiveness might be the result of assiduous local canvassing or, as in the ANC's case, the ability to deploy market research to understand the aspirations of voters. The key task for young political parties is to show that they understand, can articulate and then respond to citizens' needs.

The shift to representative politics presents a steep learning curve for political parties. The temptation during a campaign is undoubtedly to suggest that the party has the solution to the issues about which citizens are concerned. As Arriagada cautions, the leaders of the transition must be capable of inspiring and exciting people, but at the same time, they must convince the populace that sometimes they will have to wait, and adjust their demands to the reality of the political situation. Political parties need to be responsive to public opinion, but ultimately, they also have a responsibility for leading and shaping public opinion according to what is realistic.

THE TRANSITIONAL EXPERIENCE: INSIGHTS, NOT TEMPLATES

In a publication of this length it is not possible to cover all the possible issues that might emerge during a transition from one political system to another. The chapters provide four personal perspectives on the process of transition, by authors involved in the political process. Inevitably, they focus on specific elements of political change, and the role played by political parties. Their approach to the role of the political parties differs according to that personal experience. But one of the central points of the paper is that although the experience of other countries provides some useful

insights and examples, there is no template for the transition to democracy, or indeed from authoritarianism to any other political system. Each of the case studies highlights how uncertain and unpredictable that process is.

The task for political parties is to provide vehicles that can help the public to understand, navigate, and shape the process of transition. They should offer citizens the opportunity of involvement and influence, build public faith and legitimacy in the political system, and help to establish a common political culture. Parties' performance will be a key determinant in the quality of both the political system and the democratic culture that surrounds it. The final chapter examines how these experiences might be relevant to the conditions in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere in the Middle East.

For all political parties, the period of transition will be characterised by significant wins followed by punishing losses; by gains and by failures. The ultimate test for political parties, and for the consolidation of democracy, is partly how parties build on success. But it is as much about how they react and respond to failure. The legitimacy and durability of the political system requires political parties that are both responsive and resilient. We hope that the experiences shared by current and former party activists and advisers in the subsequent chapters provide some insight in managing that challenge for their counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa.

"Transitions are processes, not definitive acts that take place over a short space of time. They have epic moments that catalyse the most intense civil feelings of their people, as we have seen in so many places; in Portugal; in the streets of Prague, Warsaw, or Montevideo; or in Tahrir Square. But they also have bitter moments when even the most hopeful lose heart upon seeing their leaders accept negotiations and compromises that please no one but are presented as being essential."

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AS SEEN FROM LATIN AMERICA

A prologue

BY GENARO ARRIAGADA

Around the year 1975, whilst Chile was still feeling the effects of the 1973 military *coup d'état* that ousted President Salvador Allende, I travelled around Spain and Portugal. After the fall of the oldest dictatorships in Europe, these countries had become sites of pilgrimage for those of us who believe in democracy.

Over the course of the following decade, I was to witness the transitions that transformed Latin America and, later, some of the most interesting developments in Eastern Europe and Bulgaria. I travelled around Serbia when the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia gave way to Miloševic's regime.

And, of course, those transitions that I could not personally witness, I observed from a distance, with the enthusiasm of an activist and the cold objectivity of a political analyst.

Today, like almost everybody else, I'm fascinated with the development of 'the Arab Spring'.

PRELUDE

Just as, during my early travels, I sought to learn from international experiences and take home lessons to apply to the democratic transition in my home country of Chile, so this volume seeks to compile stories from party practitioners around the globe to inform the on-going democratic transformation of the Middle East and North Africa.

Transitions are unique processes: they are carried out in different circumstances and marked by their national realities, which, even among temporally proximate transitions in countries within a single region, are distinctive. The transition in Poland cannot be compared to the transition that was happening at the same time in neighbouring Czechoslovakia; the same is true of the transitions that took place in Argentina or Brazil.

However, regardless of these differences, those who led these transitions faced similar problems and often revealed the same doubts. Latin America and the countries of the Arab Spring are separated by very different cultures and histories but, upon analysing these political processes, it is evident that, regardless of this, there are many experiences which they share; there are clearly good decisions and poor decisions common to party leaders, as well as familiar and concrete policy alternatives to adopt or reject.

WHAT IS A TRANSITION?

For reasons that are essential for policy design, it is necessary not to confuse a transition with the 'liberalisation' of an authoritarian regime. The latter occurs when an autocrat decides to release some pressure and loosen his or her repressive grip a little by, say, freeing a hundred political prisoners, ending martial law, allowing a greater degree of freedom of the press or even calling an election (which he will invariably manipulate). These are relatively simple measures, the impetus for which is a rational, sometimes intelligent, calculation made by the dictator who decides to give or take, relax or tighten, as a technique to better retain power. As this is his intent, any democratic effects of such actions are almost always reversible and at a low social and political cost.

A transition, on the other hand, is a more complicated reality, since it is born not from a concession from the established order, but rather as the consequence of the luck of the draw – a balance of power between the force of the dictatorship and that of the opposition.

At the beginning of their transitions, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Poland, Serbia and South Africa, to name but a few examples, were rigid – sometimes brutal – dictatorships, in which, however, a significant opposition was present. In each, there was a constant and sustained clash between these two forces that, although possessing equal power, derived that power from different sources.

The dictatorships in these countries were reinforced by the State, the security services and the military system; but also by significant social groups. It's important to stress this last point, since many democracy activists tend to forget that dictatorships (unfortunately) usually count on the backing of social classes and vast groups of people who stand to benefit from patronage networks and clientelism.

The opposition positions themselves in contrast, with a more inclusive and diverse makeup, encompassing not only the interests of political parties but also, of such moral actors as clerical or religious authorities who support democratisation; organisations that defend human rights; trade unions; student, academic and artistic organisations; and professional guilds or associations.

Within this context, there is a likelihood that a stalemate will develop between these two forces: the dictatorship will believe it has sufficient power to stay in government, but not enough to quash the opposition. The opposition, in turn, will feel confident about having conquered gaps in society where the dictatorship couldn't reach and which they could retain against any attempt at capture by the regime; and yet, they will also doubtless be aware of the fact that their power is, to a certain extent, useless if they do not have the reach to change the government.

This is therefore a 'catastrophic equilibrium,' in the sense that its inevitable result will be to plunge the country into endless guerrilla politics, where coexistence, as well as the economy, will become more and more degraded and the people will be dragged into constant suffering and loss of dignity.

It is an awareness of this 'catastrophic equilibrium' that leads to a negotiation between the two conflicting forces. Given that neither can prevail and that neither will accept marginalisation, is it possible to find common ground or a political, economical, social and cultural order in which there is a place for both? Where old enemies can coexist under the same rules and dispose of the same rights and obligations?

To fully transition away from authoritarian rule, this is the path that any country must take. "A homeland for all" was the slogan of the Chilean transition; "the war is over" was the motto under which the Spanish started negotiations for a political system that was nobody's ideal, but which could be acceptable to everyone. Complete victory over 'the enemy' will almost inevitably divide the country into two parts, one with complete rights and the other condemned to subordination, mediocre economic prospects and retribution in the form of persecution or exile. From the perspective of those in power, they have sufficient weapons and violent means to annihilate the opposition and its leaders. The resources are there, there's no doubt about that; but political viability is not. Quashing a brave and large opposition is not possible without walking along the path of crimes against humanity in a world that increasingly condemns these acts; not to mention the additional risk that the army, obliged to shoot its own people, will itself divide and, as such, give way to civil war.

After observing Egypt in 2011, I have no doubt that a transition is underway, due to the fundamental reason, amongst others, that its society currently inhabits this 'catastrophic equilibrium' that characterised almost all the transitions I have observed. The forces of the old regime have not disappeared and it would be difficult to quash an army that is the tenth largest on Earth, as well as powerful active economic sectors and underlying popular sectors which were linked to the NDP. However, there is also a force which is not smaller and which no army would dare to suppress. It is social, it is political, and it is religious; however, it can also be found in the middle class sectors, which are secular and more liberal. In this context, Egypt and Tunisia – just like Chile, Poland, South Africa and so many other countries before them, do not have any other rational exit than the political negotiation process that we have come to know as transition. It will not be easy, without a doubt; it will take time, definitely. But of all the possible paths, this is the most probable and, in any case, the least expensive for the nation and the people.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE TRANSITION

Fights against dictatorships, as well as being lengthy – how long did it take in Eastern Europe, in Spain, in Chile? – are cruel and represent suffering for many. However, in the middle of the pain, misery and fear there were many actions and sacrifices, and, sometimes an entire moral climate, which allow combatants to remember the transition as a time during which part of the best of humanity shone through courageous political action. Under repression, being an opponent to the regime isn't just a political option, but also a moral vocation, the fulfilment of which requires bravery and generosity – even the forfeiture of one's own life, freedoms and the rights to live in one's homeland. Being an opponent can mean exclusion from the job market, expulsion from public administration, from universities and from the media; and condemnation to economic mediocrity.

Politics shows these noble characteristics in the opposition of the most diverse regimes, from the communists in Poland or Czechoslovakia, to the right-wing military dictatorships like Pinochet in Chile or the apartheid regime in South Africa. The brand of these activists was decency and their objective was the unity of men and women whom, although they had different philosophies and political projects, supported common action to denounce crime and demand justice and freedom.

This was the observation Timothy Garton Ash made about Eastern Europe: "travelling through this region over the last decade, I found treasures: examples of great moral courage and intellectual integrity; comradeship, deep friendship, family life... quality of relations between men and women of very different backgrounds, and once bitterly opposed faiths- an ethos of solidarity."[1]

These common characteristics of the opposition to dictatorship are elements that will enable those who drive transitions to democracy to construct agreements around a minimal programme and a way of conducting politics that is able to process differences and, when the moment arrives, put them aside in order to save the process of democratisation.

On the other hand, crafting a policy programme will raise a dilemma: a more specific, maximalist and profound policy programme will tend to jeopardise the chances of reaching agreement, while, on the other hand, scaling back its aims will allow for a wider coalition. It's not about complete unity, but rather proposing a society where various groups can exist in conflict but also in co-operation; and in which everyone can have the place respectful of their dignity and influence.

It's true that a society cannot reach complete unity; but it doesn't need to, either. What a society requires is something simpler and more realistically achievable: that within its diversity, various agreements and commitments are established, that they have a wide base of consensus over essential questions, and less concurrence over specific questions that are susceptible to controversy. Agreements aimed at consolidating a political system that, while not an ideal form equally shared by all, permits constructive dialogue among even the most hardened of adversaries, is a necessary and achievable programmatic objective. The necessary instruments to achieve this end include the disposition to negotiate, a sense of proportion and measure, and a commitment to the search for justice.

Unity is one of the greatest factors in the success of a transition. If the people perceive that authoritarianism has been succeeded by democrats who fight amongst each other with the same ferocity with which they once fought the dictatorship, they will lose faith that the transition process can lead to a better world.

This construction of agreements between forces that support the transition may find an opportunity in the holding of the first free elections. As is well known, in the initial phases of transitions, political parties spring up everywhere. Each group, irrespective of its size, and even some individuals, wants to create its own association and in this way claim a seat and a voice in all meetings and negotiations. The first elections reveal the truth about the political scene as they help to establish the relative weight of each party and eliminate from the game dozens of false parties, many of which may have seemed attractive but in fact turned out to be unviable in terms of popular support.

Every transition has its 'Tahrir Square', but, subsequently, the democratisation process has to move from there in order to progress towards the constitution of truly representative parties and the coalitions among them – a process for which elections are a major component. Once the number of parties is reduced down to a few – as has happened after the elections in Tunisia and Egypt – the task of constructing agreements will become easier.

But there is also a need to warn against a danger; namely, that the electoral fight will lead to a policy centred in pure competition, ignoring the fact that in all democracies, but particularly in transitional environments, collaboration is equally necessary. It's true, as we will see later, that a transition supposes, in an almost inexcusable manner, negotiation with the forces of the old regime. But before this, permanent negotiation between the forces that support transition is necessary. Commitments, agreements, and consultations, are essential.

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1   Ash, T.G. (1990) *The Magic Lantern* (New York: Random House).

THE GREAT DILEMMA: NEGOTIATION WITH THE DICTATORSHIP

If the search for agreements to construct "a homeland for all" is limited to negotiations with those forces that fought against the dictatorship and that aspire to be a democracy, the task will be an easy journey, replete with moral satisfaction, something which is worthy of pride. The problem is that those commitments are not sufficient, and rather it is also necessary to search for agreements with the dictators and the forces that supported them in order to contribute towards achieving peace and stability.

There are no alternatives. All transitions – although to different extents – suppose discussions and agreements between "old prisoners and their old jailers." Since time immemorial, these negotiations with dictators have given way to dilemmas, anguish and deep moral conflicts.

For example, on 5 October 1988, Pinochet was beaten in a plebiscite. However, this was no clear political victory but rather the result of a 'stifled stalemate' – a draw. Pinochet's opposition had obtained 57 percent of the votes, but Pinochet obtained 43 percent. The people had primarily inclined towards the opposition, but Pinochet had the backing of the entire Armed Forces and of one of the more conservative business classes in the world. It is true that Pinochet could not ignore the results of the plebiscite; but it is no less certain that the opposition could not unilaterally dictate the terms under which the transition from dictatorship to democracy would occur. Neither of the political actors – government nor opposition – was in a position to impose conditions over the other; hence, there would be a 'negotiated transition', or the protests and resistance will begin anew. The only alternative to a 'negotiated transition' is endless conflict.

THE CONTENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

But Chile is just one case. There are dozens – from Argentina, Spain, or Uruguay; to Eastern Europe or Russia; to South Africa – in which the same moral dilemmas are raised, although the specific forms and characteristics of the political conflicts varied. Observing different transitions, one could say that compromises with dictatorships and the forces that support them will arise in four main areas:

The first area and the one that has very complex moral connotations is what to do about previous violations of human rights under the previous regime. This is a debate that arose in almost the same terms in Chile and Argentina, in Poland and Germany, Spain and Greece, or in South Africa. The initial positions are irreconcilable. The supporters of the dictatorship – and, of course, those who are personally connected to their crimes – say that nothing should be done: simply forgive and forget.

The reasons they cite are the search for reconciliation, the need to look to the future and not the past, and the risk that to do otherwise might worsen the tension with the military since some of the human rights violators are within the army. Opposing these voices, the transition actors demand justice, arguing that a democracy cannot be built on the foundation of forgetting crimes against humanity; that it is difficult to look to the future if there is no common viewpoint of the past.

At present, there is no – and to date, there never has been a – solution that completely satisfies either of the aforementioned positions. The demand for justice is indisputable and, for the forces that support transition, denying it is an ethical and moral impossibility. But, at the same time, it is true that in no transition, not in Southern or Eastern Europe, South Africa or in Latin America, has complete justice been achieved.

Confronting this matter, the transitions have concentrated their efforts in various objectives: truth, justice, reparation, memory, reconciliation. Justice is the front where the advances have been more limited; although, in some cases, enormously symbolic gestures were made, such as the indictment of former dictators, commanders of the armed forces, and heads of security units – actions that have been particularly proactive in the transitions of Argentina and Chile and slower in those of Brazil and Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, knowing the truth tends to arise as a concrete objective during the transition, including notable efforts by so-called 'truth commissions', which have been spreading across ever-more varied regions. There have been, as well, successful experiences in achieving reparation, as well as initiatives to ensure the remembrance of the crimes committed and commemorating the fallen by constructing monuments and freeing their names of the stigma that was once conferred by the dictatorships.

The second major topic of negotiation is the corporate interests of the army. The armed forces, like any bureaucracy, have feudal interests related to their profession, such as the appropriation of a portion of the national wealth to enable them to finance their activities; or the defence of a comprehensive lifestyle that entails a career path, academies, casinos, clubs, hospitals, and military communities. In defence of this status, the army demands the civil power that guarantees them the monopoly of weapons, the respect of the careers of the officers; the non-reduction of the wages of officers; and the maintenance of their facilities in the form of casinos, neighbourhoods, health services.

Out of pragmatism, the transitions to democracy in Spain and Brazil raised the military spending above the previous figure under their respective military regimes and, in Chile, incoming democratic governments did not make lowering them a priority. A drastic cut in military spending, wages and benefits of the military officers is a possibility when presented with defeated military units (e.g. Greece after Cyprus, or Argentina following the Malvinas conflict), but even so it will create a deep unease that, in the case of Argentina – in addition to human rights trials – led to four uprisings headed by mid-rank officers between 1987 and 1990. In this manner, armed forces tend to demand that transitions should not impede their maintaining their control over industries that they consider to be strategic such as, for example, those linked to weapons production; those that provide goods and services for the army; and telecommunications, energy, or natural resources companies.

The third great negotiation topic concerns the political role of the military. One of the prime objectives of any transition is the withdrawal of the army from politics, their submission to legitimate civil power and the rejection of the idea that they have a duty of guardianship that, in critical situations, imbues them with the right to intervene in the political process.

To satisfy these demands, the most political group of officers will seek to negotiate their own transition, so as to ensure that the transfer of political power is gradual. In extreme cases, they will demand, as in Chile, that the former dictator remains the Commander-in-Chief of the army for nearly a decade; this is no different from the demands of the Sandinista Army before the election of Nicaraguan president Violeta Chamorro. In other cases, the armed forces will demand that the Constitution recognises that the most senior military commanders – directly or through a Security Council – have a guardianship role over the State, or they will demand a place in the Cabinet for one or several military ministers (in Brazil, three) who are in active service; or they will demand special laws that consecrate the autonomy of the armed forces with respect to civil power and the non-interference of this organism in promotions, retirement and stationing.

On occasion, they have attempted to limit parliamentary power over the defence budget. They frequently demand the autonomy of military tribunals and the extension of their jurisdiction so that they are the only ones with judicial authority over military personnel. The inventory of these mechanisms, which in the academic world tend to be grouped under the title 'authoritarian enclaves', can be quite lengthy. However, they have not had an enduring effect, given that they contradict not only democratic constitutional rights but also the way of thinking of the professional army. The transitions have become alive to this, as evidenced by the fact that almost none of these enclaves survive today.

The two previous points, which make reference to the armed forces, are very relevant to the situations in Tunisia and Egypt; and less so to Libya and probably Syria, where the transitions must first start by rebuilding an army that has been destroyed in a civil war.

The fourth topic, which is manifest in only in some transitions, concerns the economy and relates to privatisation. In Latin America, the right-wing military dictatorships drove a collection of economic and privatisation reforms, which created a close relationship with the business sectors, as has also happened in Tunisia and Egypt. These divestitures of public enterprises were almost always undertaken with a lack of transparency and many of them constituted acts of corruption; thus, the pressure to reverse them is not surprising.

However, this decision, although fair in principle, can trigger a conflict with an economically powerful social class with strong ties binding it to international economies in the capitalist world. This can also exacerbate fears of insecurity and instability in the rules of the game, which, in a vicious cycle, can undermine the economy by discouraging investment or provoking capital flight. Under the weight of these fears, the Latin American experiences preferred not to innovate in these matters arguing, additionally, that it was a way of avoiding a military and business alliances being unified against them, which would create a very adverse correlation of powerful enemies.

AN ACCELERATOR AND A BRAKE

Transitions are continuous processes; they are not definitive acts that take place over a short space of time. They have epic moments that catalyse the most intense civil feelings of their people, as we have seen in so many places; in Portugal, where the people placed carnations into the barrels of the rifles that soldiers carried; in the streets of Prague, Warsaw, or Montevideo; or in Tahrir Square. But they also have bitter moments when even the most hopeful lose heart upon seeing their leaders, under the threat of back-sliding, having to accept negotiations and compromises that please no one but are presented as being essential.

Along this long road, the leaders of the transition must be capable of inspiring and exciting people, taking to the streets in mass demonstrations to show that backtracking is not acceptable, driving them to the institutions and the polls. But, at the same time, leaders must convince the populace that sometimes they will have to wait and adjust demands to reflect to what is realistic. A transition that only talks about moderating its objectives and styles will surely sow its own failure; but, likewise, it is probable that one that radicalises intemperately, will first split and then, weakened, be quashed.

The leaders must know that sometimes it is braver to call for limits than to lead ostensibly heroic actions that have the effect of tens of thousands of ordinary men and women seeking order and security at the expense of liberty. In the climate supporters of left- or right-wing dictatorships will show a Machiavellian reliance on disorder as a means to undermine the transition. As their leaders cultivate 'unrest for unrest's sake', citizens become exasperated with politicians, which may ultimately lead them to turn to opponents of the current leaders who endorse 'order for order's sake'. Leaders, therefore, in driving the transitions, must know how to use an accelerator and a brake. Knowing when to apply one or the other is not a technique but rather an art, just like politics.

"Since its election in 2002, one of the key components of the Justice and Development Party's success was its ability to push back against the military's dominance and allow for a more normal political order to emerge. Looking back at what was achieved, I would identify the party's internal cohesion; strong leadership; and smart, patient and incremental approach to dealing with the armed forces as key factors to our success in normalising the civil-military space."

THE CASE OF TURKEY

Normalising relations with the military

BY SUAT KINIKLIOĞLU

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) went from an off-shoot of a banned opposition movement to the dominant force in contemporary Turkish politics in the space of a decade.

Suat Kiniklioğlu, one of the AKP's leading protagonists recounts his own career trajectory alongside his party's ascendance to power.

He attributes this rise to several factors, foremost amongst which was the AKP's management of civil-military relations during and after the transition period. The role of parties – specifically, the ruling AKP – in providing a bulwark to military capture of the political space provides a timely example for today's democratic activists.

Above all, Kiniklioğlu concludes that, for all its strategic mettle and canny campaigning, ultimately, the AKP's success is attributable to fortuitous timing and the impatience of an electorate committed to the notion that, after decades of single-party rule, the time for democracy had come.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS   DIPD   PAGE 27

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION[1]

1923   Assembly declares Turkey a republic and instates Kemal Ataturk as its first president.

1928   Turkey is made a secular state; the clause establishing Islam as official state religion is excised from the country's constitution.

1950   The country's first openly contested elections see victory for the Democratic Party (DP).

1960   A military *coup d'état* deposes and outlaws the ruling DP. Subsequently, in 1961, a new constitution establishes a bicameral legislature.

1965   Süleyman Demirel is elected on the Justice Party (AP) ticket, an offshoot of the outlawed DP, to his first of seven terms as Prime Minister.

1971   The military compels Demirel to resign office after a period of violent political unrest.

1980   After prolonged political deadlock and upheaval, another military coup results in the imposition of martial law.

1983   With a ban on both the DP and AP, Demirel re-establishes the party as the Right Path Party (DYP). The general election is won by Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP).

1984   The internationally-recognised terrorist organisation the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) launches an armed struggle against the Turkish state for an autonomous Kurdistan.

1993   Tansu Çiller (DYP) becomes Turkey first female Prime Minister and Demirel is elected as Turkey's ninth president. The ceasefire with the PKK breaks down.

1995   Çiller coalition fails. The pro-Islamist Welfare Party (RP) wins election, but lacking sufficient support to form a government, two centre-right parties form anti-Islamist coalition. The centre-right coalition fails the following year and the RP leads the first pro-Islamic government since the founding of the Republic of Turkey.

1997   After a military-led campaign, the RP is forced to resign and is replaced by a new coalition led by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's ANAP.

1998   The RP, the largest party in parliament, is banned. Yılmaz resigns as Prime Minister amidst allegations of corruption and is replaced by Bülent Ecevit.

2001   The Constitutional Court bans the pro-Islamist opposition Virtue Party (FP); former members establish the new pro-Islamist *Saadet* Party (SP).

2002   Early elections are called after eight ministers resign over PM Ecevit's refusal to stand down. The Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins a landslide victory after pledging to adhere to secular principles of Constitution. Deputy Leader Abdullah Gül is appointed Prime Minister.

2003   Constitutional changes allow AKP Leader Tayyip Erdoğan to run for office. After winning a seat in parliament, Erdoğan takes over from Gül as Prime Minister.

2004   EU agrees to open talks on Turkish accession.

2007   Over objections from the National Security Council, Gül wins the presidency and the AKP takes a commanding majority in parliamentary elections.

2011   AKP wins a resounding victory at polls and Erdoğan embarks upon a third term of office.

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1   Partially adapted from the BBC's Turkey timeline. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1023189.stm Accessed March 2012.

SETTING THE STAGE

My father was one of the first generation of Turkish guest-workers to immigrate to Germany in 1962. I was born there as the first child of a central Anatolian family that was trying to build a new future in the middle of continental Europe. I was 12 years old when we returned to Turkey having command over a 200-word Turkish vocabulary. In 1982, just two years after the 1980 military coup, I entered the prestigious Turkish Air Force Academy.

However, after graduating as a second lieutenant, I realised that I wanted to become active in politics. I quit the Air Force and went to study political science in Canada. Once back in Turkey, I was to eventually set up my own foreign policy research centre and became a transatlantic fellow at a US think tank. Upon my return, Turkey was experiencing one of the most interesting phases of its battle to become a 'normal' democracy and I was about to become part of that journey. This chapter tells my story and that of my country's journey toward democracy.

Turkey's military and political elites have long co-existed in an uneasy partnership to oversee the republic's affairs. A number of factors have enabled the military to influence Turkish politics in the name of protecting national unity, democracy, and secularism. These include the role played by the army in liberating, building, and modernising the nation; the country's relatively immature democratic culture and institutions; and numerous constitutional tools.[2]

The armed forces have always occupied a special position in Turkey. Their political weight enters into party and government calculations on a range of matters far beyond military interests. As the Turkish Armed Forces By-Law No. 35 makes explicit, "The primary duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect and watch for the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as was defined in the Constitution."

Since its election in 2002, one of the key contributing factors to the Justice and Development Party's (AKP's) success in power was its ability to push back against the military's dominance and allow for a more normal political order to emerge. Obviously, this was no easy task given the decades-long domination of the military, the country's history of military interventions, and the self-perception of our military as the guardian of the republic. The Turkish armed forces had dictated policy to civilian governments in the past and they saw themselves as the protectors of the secular order, imported to Turkey from the French – a culture that was, in our party's estimation, unnecessarily militant.

Looking back at what was achieved, I would identify the party's internal cohesion; strong leadership by Prime Minister Erdoğan; and a smart, patient and incremental approach to dealing with the armed forces as key factors to our success in normalising the civil-military space. In addition, we were blessed with the broad public support for Turkey's drive to membership in the European Union (EU) – and one of the fundamental reforms required by the EU process was the lessening of the military's role in Turkey's politics. The EU process was key in igniting the political action needed for more civilian weight in the political system.

The most significant and symbolic reform to lessen the role of the armed forces was the constitutional reform pertaining to the role of the National Security Council (NSC). Functioning as a *de facto* cabinet and dominated by the military, the NSC was key to exerting influence on democratically elected governments and, as evidenced in 1997, served as a platform to impose political actions onto the government.[3]

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2   Narlı, N. (2000) "Civil military relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 1; P. 107.
3   In February 1997, the NSC forced the democratically elected but Islamist Welfare Party (RP) out of office through, among other tactics, a deliberate public opinion campaign. The incident is widely known as the 28 February intervention in Turkey.

CHALLENGING THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE TURKISH MILITARY

When the AKP assumed office in November 2002, prevailing wisdom held that its election was a fluke, precipitated by a number of unique conditions. That these conservative Anatolians could have lasting impact on the political order was doubted by many. However, the AKP government, to its advantage, had inherited a pre-existing trend toward reducing the institutional influence of the military. In 1999, the coalition government removed military judges from state security courts. In 2001, parliament amended the constitution to increase the civilian membership of the NSC and removed the requirement that the Council of Ministers give 'priority consideration' to the NSC's recommendations.

Once the AKP was in power, the requirement that the Secretary General of the NSC be a serving member of the military was abolished, as was the Secretary General's unlimited access to any civilian agency and the authority to monitor the implementation of NSC recommendations. Perhaps most importantly, meetings of the NSC were reduced from once a month to once every two months; this made it much more difficult for the military to use the NSC as an instrument of sustained pressure. The overall trend was to start accession negotiations with Brussels and a frantic effort to pass reform packages through parliament.

OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES POSED BY THE EXISTING REGIME

By 2007, five years into the AKP's rule, Turkey's conservatives, Islamists, liberals, small and large businesses, and a good part of the media formed a coalition, which the military was unable to ignore. That said, elements within the military, security, judicial forces, and media – together termed the 'deep state' – were determined to resist the democratically-elected government by any means necessary.[4]

A decisive crisis erupted in 2007 when a new president had to be elected. Turkey's secular establishment always viewed the presidency as the last bastion of the regime and thus viewed the ascendancy of an AKP member to the presidency as anathema. The military made it clear that it would resist such a possibility to the very end. As the largest party in parliament, the AKP was naturally planning to propose a candidate for the presidency. That is exactly what the AKP did on 24 April 2007 when it announced then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the upcoming election of Turkey's eleventh President.

However, on 27 April 2007, the NSC's Chief-of-Staff issued an e-memorandum to the effect that Turkey's next president should stick to the militant secularism that the armed forces favoured.[5] At the same time, it warned the Government that the military would do everything within its power to prevent the Presidency to be taken by an AKP member. The situation was very tense. The evening hours of 27 April through the next morning of were critical for the survival of the party and our fragile democracy. In the past, many governments yielded to similar pressure and the military almost always got its way. We deliberated over hours and hours of debate in the party headquarters about the party's next move.

Turkish society was also keenly watching what the government would do in the face of such an open intervention by the military. The public had to see that the democratically elected government was not giving in and was maintaining its stand. The leadership decided to issue a strong response to the military's e-memorandum the

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4   The deep state (Turkish: *derin devlet*) is a group of influential anti-democratic actors within the Turkish political system, composed of high-level elements within the intel-ligence services, Turkish military, security, judiciary, and mafia. The notion of deep state is similar to that of a 'state within the state'. For those who believe in its existence, the political agenda of the deep state involves an allegiance to nationalism, corporatism, and state interests. Violence and other means of pressure have historically been employed in a largely covert manner to manipulate political and economic elites and ensure specific interests are met within the seemingly democratic framework of the political landscape.

5   It later became clear that the e-memorandum of 27 April 2007 was penned by the Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, himself.

next day at a press conference reminding the armed forces that they should remain within the framework of the constitution, cautioning them not to interfere in the government's deliberations, and underlining the significance of each institution respecting the other's space. The day was won. The military did not expect such a reaction from the government. Public opinion was clearly in favour of the government's stance.

Within days, voting for the presidency started in the parliament. In coordination with the military, the main opposition party and other elements of the 'deep state' came up with a rather peculiar and particular interpretation of the voting procedure in Parliament. According to this procedure, intended to prevent the election of Mr. Gül, a minimum of 367 members of parliament needed to be present at the time of voting. When a quorum did not materialise, as the opposition parties refrained from taking the floor (some of them coerced into absenteeism by the military), the Constitutional Court, acted in consort with elements of the 'deep state' to annul the voting. Hence, despite earlier examples of presidents elected by much lower numbers, Mr. Gül's election was deemed unconstitutional on very tenuous grounds.

In response, the AKP issued an official announcement that Turkey's 'deep state' had impeded the democratic election of Mr. Gül for president and, subsequently, the party called for an early election as a retort to the government following the farcical inability of the Turkish parliament to elect a new president. Turkish society, especially in the conservative heartland, as well as the Kurdish dominated southeast was outraged.

MOUNTING A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN

On 2 May 2007, I wrote an op-ed in the *International Herald Tribune* criticising the 'deep state,' giving a more complete picture to audiences abroad who may have had difficulty in figuring what was going in Turkey.[6] It would emerge to be a turning point in my career: one thing led to another and I applied to become a candidate for parliament in the early election scheduled for 22 June 2007.

In the summer of 2007, I found myself on the campaign trail. The party's provincial organisation was very strong and thus I was entrusted into the able hands of the local party organisation. Prime Minister Erdoğan put me on the Çankırı list because my father was originally from Çankırı, which is located about an hour north of Ankara. I vividly remember the first day of my arrival and the curious looks directed at me. However, we quickly bonded with the local party officials and they extended critical support to me in my first-ever election campaign.

The local party organisation is obviously fully aware of the local issues, sensitivities and important centres of local public opinion. They quickly introduced me to the local press and, I joined the other party candidates in targeting different audiences in my province. For instance, I ended up speaking more to the elite of the province, giving speeches at the local vocational school and visiting academics, while the other candidates from our party were taking care of the more older and provincial sections of our district. Local party offices also served as private office space for the candidates and, later, for members of parliament. This is a convenient arrangement, as the candidate or MP does not need to rent a separate office and can make use of the local party structure.

Turkish election campaigns are very intense and it is key to engage with the electorate face-to-face. After a whole day of visits to NGOs, unions, shopkeepers, and others, we would conduct evening visits to private homes. One particular evening, I found myself in an apartment crammed with people who wanted to see their new AKP candidate face-to-face and ask him questions directly. The election was pretty much coloured by the injustice meted out to Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, whom all of our supporters wanted to be our next president. So, I began speaking to my electorate about the virtue

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6   Kiniklioğlu, S. (2007) "Getting Turkey Right", *International Herald Tribune,* 2 May. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/opinion/02iht-edsuat.2.5531737.html

of democracy, the will of the people, and the moral high ground we were on as the Turkish deep state prevented Abdullah Gül to become president. I probably spoke for about 15 minutes to a very kind and warm audience.

When I was done, I asked whether anyone had any questions. One person raised his hand and said: "What will happen to the wall next to our building?" Totally perplexed and not knowing what he was talking about at all, I quickly referred to the mayor of Çankırı who was with us, and thus I escaped the embarrassment of not knowing this issue which seemed very dear to the audience. The mayor gave him the right answer and I was in the good books. The rest of the evening was very pleasant, as they were happy to see their candidate converse with them.

It later dawned on me that the Turkish electorate does not differentiate between local and general elections. Elections are opportunities for the electorate to get things done that are waiting to be done. For him, fixing the wall next to his apartment building was more of a priority than the test of democracy we were going through. My speech about the significance of this election, the momentum the party had in giving the deep state a very strong lesson and all of the other national issues I entertained were of secondary priority. They cared about this very minor local issue – the wall next door that needed to be repaired. Running a campaign for the first time, I was led to believe that the locals were in tune with my excitement about our young democracy.

During my campaign, we made visits even to the most remote villages, as the electorate is very sensitive to personally interacting with the candidate in their village. In another village, I again engaged with the villagers on the significance of this election, what it meant in our history and the need to vote for the AKP. As we were once again about to talk about the presidential election, I was stopped by the village foreman. He said abruptly: "No need to tell us all of that. We all know that! Tell us what kind of guy you are!"

The fact is that the villagers of the most remote village in Turkey are fully hooked into the global information network. Almost all of the villagers are equipped with satellite dishes. They do not have the hectic lifestyles of urban Turks. They do not have kids to be picked up from day-care. They have dinner at 6pm and are by the TV at 7pm. They follow the news – every single discussion program – and are actually quite up-to-date.

Contrary to my assumptions, the Turkish villagers were quite aware of the challenges against our democratic order. They were rather well-informed. However, they wish to socialise and get closer to their candidates. They want to see if the candidate is "one of them." Can he sit down and eat with them? Does he attend Friday prayers? Is he reasonably devout or at least respectful to those who are devout? The citizens keenly watch your every move, listen to every word you utter, and want to know whether you will be with them throughout your term in office.

At the time, Party Leader Gül was seen by many as having the presidency unjustly stolen from his reach thanks to the regime's manipulation of the constitution. We campaigned by pledging to the people that they should give us the power in parliament to change the constitution for ourselves (we needed a two-thirds majority for that). We won the election with a credible 47 per cent. The legitimacy conferred by such an overwhelming result in the election allowed us to move forward and overcome the resistance of decades-long authoritarianism. In August 2007, only a month after the parliamentary election, we succeeded in electing Abdullah Gül as Turkey's eleventh president. The deep state was psychologically and physically beaten.

It was a turning point for our democracy. Against all odds and after a very strenuous election campaign, we were able to elect Abdullah Gül as president. The election of Abdullah Gül signified a turning point in the struggle between the centre and the periphery, as well as between the militantly secularists and the conservatives. It came as a huge psychological blow to the military and the 'deep state'. There is nothing more powerful, more convincing and more legitimate than the power of the people. Winning a clean election and acting in the footsteps of a mandate given by the people provides one with a great sense of satisfaction and purpose.

That night, most Turks felt that a critical milestone had been passed by instituting Abdullah Gül to the Presidency. We succeeded doing that against all odds and by the sole power of the people who spoke decisively in the general election. However, while the 'deep state' was severely wounded, it was by no means dead.

BUILDING ON ELECTORAL SUCCESSES

After the election of Abdullah Gül to the presidency, things returned to normal. Parliament was busy legislating and I found myself representing my country in a variety of international meetings. One of our main advantages was the fact that the opposition parties were in disarray; they could not formulate a coherent message attacking us and, most importantly, they were internally chaotic. The AKP assumed a very dominant role in the national political discourse.

In the absence of a normal opposition that had a chance to beat us at the ballot box, the 'deep state' decided to play foul again. This time, the 'deep state' decided to strike at the AKP by bringing suit demanding the party's closure before the Constitutional Court. In the past, Turkish political parties had been closed by the Constitutional Court either for having ethnic or divisive political platforms or, as was the case with AKP's predecessors, on the basis of being engaged in 'anti-secularist activities'. The case against the AKP was opened by Turkey's top prosecutor on charges that the AKP had become a "focal point for anti-secular activities"

The closure case was filed in March 2008, only eight months after our resounding electoral victory. However, the evidence provided by the prosecutor was very weak, mostly consisting of individual statements often taken out of context. All of us were puzzled. On one hand, we were trying to respond to the needs of our society after a tumultuous political period. On the other hand, we were faced with a closure case that psychologically crippled us.

The party leadership decided to separate the two issues and urged us to work even harder in the Parliament, passing legislation as if there was no closure case against us. We legislated day and night, but the case was looming in the back of our minds. The international economic crisis had just begun and there was a lot of concern that a decision to close the party could result in a devastating economic crisis. What would happen if they would close the party and ban dozens of our senior leadership? It was a truly peculiar situation. I remember hosting foreign delegations whose members could not make sense of what was going on. One thing we were really good at, though, was highlighting the stark paradox of being subjected to such a case after our overwhelming election victory of July 2007.

We used every foreign visit, every news commentary, every op-ed in the international media to fight against the closure case in the court of international opinion. Given the reformist agenda back in those days, there was a lot of sympathy toward us. We underlined the AKP's democratising agenda, its ability to connect the Turkish economy with the global economy and of course our pro-European foreign policy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) figures were at record-high levels. We fed the international media with a lot of commentary on a daily basis. I sometimes found myself speaking to prominent news outlets, such as BBC Television and CNN four times a day. Our aim was to convince foreign observers and the international media, as well as incoming delegations, that the closure case was unjustified and was merely a last resort of the authoritarian deep state to precipitate the fall of a democratically elected government. In this, our media campaign made a remarkable difference.

Months of wrangling for and against the party's closure ensued. We won the debate both at home and abroad, as the majority of the international community could not make sense of the case anyway. For most foreign observers, the AKP was a progressive force that had just won a remarkable election victory. They saw the attempted ban on the party as foul play. Four hundred pieces of evidence provided by the prosecutor

were discredited by the rapporteur of the Constitutional Court. And yet, there was widespread belief that the Constitutional Court would close the party anyway. Some political circles saw this moment as an opportunity and began to prepare for a post-AKP period. Yet, the closure case was eventually overcome in the summer of 2008 when the Constitutional Court did not ban the AKP, but merely fined the party.[7]

A major political crisis had been overcome and the AKP government continued to run the country. However, Turkey still grapples to this day to find an appropriate balance in civil-military relations, and the deep state mentality still lingers on within the bureaucracy. The struggle for full normalisation is far from over.

DEVELOPING INCLUSIVE PARTY STRUCTURES

Apart from the obvious appeal of the leadership and ideological orientation of the party, the AKP's success also depended greatly on the activism and proper organisation of its women's and youth branches. One of the key features of the AKP's success over the last nine years was undoubtedly the contribution of a well-functioning party organization.

Indeed, the AKP's organizational capacity is impressive. The party is visible in every neighbourhood of this country through party representatives, a youth branch and a women's branch. The party headquarters oversees the provincial party organizations that, in turn, control the counties and villages. All of the provincial organizations as well as the county structures include an executive committee, and women's and youth branches. The following initiatives have been crucial to the AKP's continued success and growth:

Empowering women in party structures: Despite the party's conservative agenda on family values and religion, the mobilization of women has been a remarkable success as the party managed to engage hundreds of thousands of women in Turkish politics. The party's women's branch regularly organises meetings, discussion groups and other social activities in every neighbourhood in this country. They collect concerns, wishes and proposals from their local communities and keep the momentum high among female members or sympathisers of the party. The party allotted significant space in the parliamentary lists as well as the local elections to women and, as a result. The party also works closely with NGOs who work on women's issues and regularly organises events with their participation. There is no doubt that the dynamism of the women's branch is also due to its very energetic leadership.

Encouraging youth participation: The second branch that has had a great deal of impact has been the youth branch. There is no doubt that many youths would join political parties to obtain a job in the government or else but most of them contributed faithfully and provided indispensable support throughout our political work. They are an investment into the future, an invaluable source for us to keep up with a very young population and a very dedicated human resource to fulfil duties of the local party organizations. The youth branch of the party is critical in the execution of a successful election campaign that takes candidates into the most remote villages and the manpower the youth branch provides is indispensable during the campaigns.

Including and involving disabled persons: The party is also very sensitive to physically disabled voters and has made sure to represent them in the executive bodies of the party. Although, there is no official quota for disabled members the party leadership has instituted an unofficial quota whereby the disabled, youth and women are properly represented in the senior management of the party. We also have had physically disabled members in the parliament who served in raising concerns and issues of Turkey's disabled citizens.

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7   The Constitutional Court decision was very close, with a majority of six to five voting in favour of closure. However, according to the Constitution, there had to be at least seven votes to effectively ban the party. Hence, the party was not closed.

CONCLUSION: THE AKP TODAY

Politics in countries like Turkey is a tough business. There are a lot of expectations from the electorate. The electorate almost sees their member of parliament as someone who has a magic wand to fix anything at anytime. Hence, sometimes very unreasonable and even unlawful requests will come to your door. The key to success is to manage these requests in a manner that shows you care. Sometimes it requires a polite but equally resolute voice explaining to them that their requests are unreasonable. If it is explained properly to them, they will understand.

The struggle to expand civil political space in our political system is on-going. A lot has been achieved throughout the first two terms of AKP rule. The NSC has become a relatively less important institution and the military's meddling even into the most unrelated issues has been curtailed. The NSC now has a civilian secretary-general and its role has been limited to the country's foreign and security issues.

The election of President Gül to the presidency has made him commander-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces. He is a historic president as it took a lot political capital and effort to get him elected. He will be remembered in Turkish republican history as the embodiment of civilianisation of our politics. To his credit, he has been a balanced and impartial president and now commands a lot of support from our society. He has been careful not to upset the internal balances and has not thought retribution to those who conspired to prevent him from becoming president.

Turkey has still a long way to go. However, the period from 2003 to 2008 will be remembered as critical years in the quest to consolidate our democracy and put civil-military relations on a normal track. I am proud of taking part and modestly contributing to this historic period of my beloved country.

KEY LESSONS FROM TURKEY: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DIMINUTION OF MILITARY POWER

- *1. Support for EU accession and broad-based coalition building.*
  The AKP rallied support for limiting the remit and role of the NSC by adopting a decisively pro-EU discourse. By espousing such a stance, the AKP not only gained greater acceptance abroad but also attracted the support of Turkey's liberals and some social democrats, since membership in the EU had been a decades-long pursuit supported by a wide spectrum of Turkish politics. While the EU process has basically stalled today, from 2003 to 2008, the EU process was indispensable in forging a consensus and a broad coalition among big business, NGOs, most of the media as well as the main political parties. Hence, smart coalition building was central to overcome the military's weight in the Turkish body politic.

- *2. Powerful internal allies in the military.*
  Secondly, it must be underlined that we were blessed with the fact that a democratically-minded Chief-of-Staff headed the army, understood the significance of the changes being made, and did not oppose them. It was crucial that General Hilmi Özkök went along with the changes our Government was introducing. It later became apparent that he was targeted internally by his comrades – even to the extent of an attempted assassination by poison,[8] because he was seen by the hardcore secularists as 'selling out to the Government'. Nevertheless, luck was also a factor in the success of the changes the AKP introduced.

- *3. Declining popular trust in the military.*
  Another fundamental dimension that weakened the army was the increasing under-

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8   See http://taraf.com.tr/haber/ozkoku-oldurmeyi-uc-kez-denemisler.htm, http://www.yeniaktuel.com.tr/tur104,157@2100.html, http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/452888.asp?cp1=1, *inter alia*.

standing among Turkish society that the military was making a lot of mistakes, especially in the fight against terrorism. The media began to unearth a number of scandals, instances of wrongdoing, and ill-intentioned decisions that cost the lives of dozens, if not hundreds, of conscripted soldiers. Formerly seen as a respected institution with little room for public scrutiny, the military began to feel the heated attention of a very inquisitive media. Gradually, the popularity of the military declined as some of the ugly features of the fight against terrorism became more public.[9] Needless to say, it also helped that the proposed reforms about civil-military relations were compiled into packages that also included many popular amendments to the penal code or the constitution. These reform packages were voted on as a whole and thus gained more legitimacy through this strategic bundling. To its credit, the main opposition party also supported these reform packages due to the popularity of the EU process at the time. Hence, a speedy passage of the reform packages in Parliament was ensured. All in all, apart from doing all the right things at the tactical level, we were also very lucky due to some of the other aspects of that time period.

- *4. Economic factors.*
  It would be impossible to understand our success without underscoring the role of the economic growth Turkey experienced under our watch. In a time span of five years, Turkey's gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita* almost tripled, foreign direct investment hit record-high levels and to this day Turkey has the best economic performance in the entire region. Had it not been for the political stability our government provided it would not been possible to achieve such economic growth. The economic success helped legitimising our work in finding an appropriate balance in civil-military relations and moving the country forward. Turks began to think that Turkey was changing and the military needed to adapt. Although, staunch pro-military pockets remain to this day in our society, the majority of Turks genuinely want normalisation. Most Turks feel admiration toward the armed forces but they do not wish the armed forces to become part of daily politics.

- *5. Investment in local party apparatus.*
  As the former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representative Tip O'Neill is often quoted as saying, "All politics is local". One of the keys to the AKP's success was that it extended its focus and campaign efforts throughout the country to a variety of constituencies and regions – urban and rural, economically stable and disadvantage – and that its candidates listened to the tangible concerns of greatest import locally. While such a wide net can stretch party resources and personnel, empowering local branch leaders to be active in their communities and encouraging candidates to spend time in far-flung constituencies can ultimately be a decisive factor for electoral success at the national level.

- *6. Strategic use of media outlets.*
  While nothing can substitute for 'face time' with citizens across the country, a political party cannot realistically have a physical presence everywhere at all times – especially in as large and diverse a country as Turkey. For this reason, among others, it is imperative to make effective use of the media, to put forth a clear and consistent message, and to hone an easily distinguishable 'brand'. The AKP's experience also demonstrates that domestic viewers and readers are not necessarily the only target audience for parties at times of democratic transition. Rather, the AKP's canny use of the international media shifted the court of public opinion in the party's favour, earning powerful international allies in the AKP's fight to overturn a longstanding regime.

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9   The military always enjoyed a very privileged status among Turks. Public opinion polls used to put the armed forces at the top of the list of most trusted institutions. The level of support for the military has considerably dropped in the last years.

- *7. Appetite for change and fortunate timing.*
  However, what ultimately tipped the balance in favour of the AKP was the urge for change in our society. The AKP became the agent delivering that change. It is undeniable that we came into office in the aftermath of a miserable decade when the fight against terrorism had strained our society to extremes, major economic crises had inflicted great damage to our social fabric and a devastating earthquake wrecked havoc in important parts of the country. The economic crisis of 2001 was particularly devastating, with 22 banks collapsing, resulting in a total loss of USD 45 billion. The AKP came into power when the structural reforms which were initiated by the former coalition government were just about to show its first concrete results. In other words, the timing of the AKP to come into office could not have been more opportune.

"Indonesia's transformation, like that of every country facing a similar task, is a work in progress. Of fundamental importance to its longterm success is the extent to which the period of initial transition produced sufficient change to ensure that regression back to an authoritarian system became increasingly difficult."

THE CASE OF INDONESIA

Establishing a democratic political system

BY KEVIN EVANS

Since the ouster of President Suharto after an unbroken 32-year rule, Indonesia has undergone a long and sometimes painful journey to become one of the developing world's most open political and economic systems with a bustling economy, relatively free civil and media space, and fair elections.

Under the New Order regime that had, for so long, decided the fate of the nation, the range of political choices was severely curtailed.

There are numerous similarities between Indonesia and the countries experiencing the Arab Spring, as countries with a history of military strongmen, repressive state control of the media, and a youthful resistance movement that effectively utilised new media.

However, as Kevin Evans finds in this chapter, if Arab Spring party activists wish to learn from the Indonesia experience, they must "learn to negotiate as democratic citizens".

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION[1]

1945   As the Japanese surrender in August, Indonesia declares its independence from the Netherlands.

1957   Martial law declared as regional rebellions emerge and little progress made to settle the issue of West Papua with the Netherlands.

1965   An abortive *coup d'état* results in the mass purge of hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists, spurring retributive vigilantism.

1966   President Sukarno deputises General Suharto with emergency powers. Subsequently, Suharto is invested as president in 1967. Suharto's New Order promotes economic development with political "stability".

1975   Indonesia invades Timor-Leste and incorporates it as a province.

1985   The corporatised state passes five basic laws enshrining the New Order political system.

1990   Political cronyism, patronage and corruption begin to reach politically damaging levels.

1997   As the East Asian economic crisis sweeps the region, Indonesia's economy shrinks by 15% in a single year.

1998   Explosion of public anger as the political elite remain immune to public suffering with demands for punishing particular individuals through whatever means available. Protests and rioting topple Suharto, who is succeeded by B.J. Habibie.

1999   Free elections result in the parliamentary election of Abdhurrahman Wahid as President. Timor-Leste votes for independence, political violence erupts and the region comes under UN administration.

2000   The Wahid administration is buffeted by scandal and political incompetence. The corruption case against former President Suharto collapses. Parliament dismisses President Wahid the following year. He is replaced by Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

2002   A human rights court is instated, testing the government's willingness to hold the military accountable for atrocities committed in Timor-Leste after the 1999 independence vote.

2003   The powerful Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is constituted.

2004   Dr. General (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono becomes the first ever popularly elected President of Indonesia.

2008   "The Empire Strikes Back". As the Corruption Eradication Commission offered no wiggle room for its suspects to escape punishment, a conspiracy is hatched to weaken and subvert its capacity.

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1   Partly adapted from the BBC's Indonesia timeline. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15114517 Accessed March 2012.

SETTING THE STAGE: PRELUDE TO A FALL

From 1998, Indonesia's *'Reformasi'* movement – literally 'reform' or 'reformation' – sought to transform the repressive statist apparata of the 'New Order' regime – the political system developed over 32 years by President Soeharto. *Reformasi* sought to introduce democratic principles and processes, enact transitional justice for those who suffered under New Order, and purge the corrupt elements within its ranks. At the same time, if society was to move forward swiftly and smoothly, it would also be necessary to retain some aspects of the previous institutions and practices, and to build a democracy that was authentically Indonesian.

The key challenge for political parties was therefore whether they could overcome historic cleavages and find some meeting ground for debate based on ideological, intellectual, or programmatic grounds. This chapter traces that process and recounts how Indonesia became a model of a prospering, majority Muslim, democratic state.

To understand the sudden implosion of President Soeharto and his self-styled New Order government, it helps to recall the underlying source of its legitimacy. Under this system, elections played the role of ritual symbols rather than providing genuine political legitimacy. As with most of its authoritarian neighbours, Indonesia's New Order gained legitimacy from its economic performance. Over 30 years of sustained economic growth, coupled with falling rates of poverty and improved socio-economic indicators, provided a strong argument in favour of maintaining the authoritarian *status quo*.

In this climate, it was widely believed that enabling further economic development required 'political stability'. The New Order achieved this by carefully engineering the political and social fabric of society, compiling all pre-existing sectoral organisations into single national bodies to 'represent' these groups, such as the national journalists' body, the teachers' association, the farmers' organisation, or the women's federation. Additionally, the Government forced all Islamist parties into one party, and all other parties (Nationalist and Christian) into another. Meanwhile, Soeharto patronised a third middle-ground party that dominated electoral and parliamentary politics.

To maintain this system, no other competitor associations or parties were allowed to emerge. Meanwhile, the government manipulated and intervened in those legal organisations and parties to ensure they did not become a source of opposition. All of this was supported by a parallel military structure, which re-enforced this corporatist control.

THE IMPLOSION OF THE NEW ORDER REGIME

The East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 shattered the New Order. Indonesia was, by far, the country worst affected by the crisis. While the government deftly managed earlier economic challenges, this time it failed badly. From the start of the crisis in July 1997 to the time of Soeharto's resignation in May 1998, the US dollar value of Indonesian stocks and shares declined by 90 per cent.

Facing effective bankruptcy, much of the press declared 'independence'; daring the Government to withdraw their licenses as they began providing full coverage to all manner of anti-government protest. Urban rioting, including attacks on Sino-Indonesian citizens and their property, demonstrated that promises of state 'protection' in exchange for citizens' acquiescence to the state were hollow. Each of these events shattered the perceived legitimacy of the New Order. In the middle of this crisis, the docile parliament demonstrated an appalling disconnect from reality by unanimously re-electing President Soeharto for yet another five-year term. Now it was just a matter of when and how the President would be forced to resign.

On 21 May 1998, barely two months after his re-election, President Soeharto did resign. This followed the resignation of key members of his Cabinet; calls by the Speaker of the Parliament for him to step down; and the military's failure, either through impotence or unwillingness, to halt a disintegration in social order. He fell when it became clear to all key groups in society that the maximum amount of reform the regime could deliver was less than was needed to address the crisis. The promised reforms were simply not enough for the government to survive. One key lesson for political economists and analysts is not to confuse surface-level political tranquillity with substantive political stability.

Soeharto was replaced by his constitutional successor, Vice President, B. J. Habibie, a German-educated professor viewed by the electorate and the student demonstrators as Soeharto's loyal follower, and therefore not representative of genuine change. However, that the succession followed a constitutional process provided a critical pointer to Indonesia's way forward. The path of revolution (e.g. dismissing the constitution, operating through 'emergency' regulations, and eliminating remnants of the old regime) held little interest for anyone but the most radical of student groups.

REFORM, NOT REVOLUTION

An early indication that Indonesia's transformation would be reformist and constitutional came when the new President was inaugurated. Once installed, the Commander of the Armed Forces immediately declared loyalty to his new Commander-in-Chief. Closing the door to extra-constitutional avenues to reform has a number of advantages, as well as some disadvantages. One major advantage was that a constitutional approach de-legitimised attempts to physically eliminate remnants of the old regime.

The lead-up to Soeharto's assumption of the presidency in the mid-1960s included the massacre of several hundred thousand people associated with the still-outlawed Indonesian Communist Party. As is usual in such situations, numerous people unconnected with the target for elimination were also murdered. Few Indonesians had the stomach for another mass execution when Soeharto was deposed. A repeat of the events of 1965 continues to haunt Indonesian politics. Indeed, so much so that, even to this day, a genuine public discussion and dialogue on those tragic events has barely begun.

This fear also contributed to a general reluctance to debate the nation's history. This became a major problem, as poor understanding ofhistoric developments led to an equally poor understanding of the design flaws in the old Constitution and questionable decisions on subsequent constitutional reform.

Among the many weaknesses of authoritarian (and corporatist) models of governance is that the long-term leader tends to become the settler of all disputes in the society. This is especially true when the official institutions are subverted by parallel and personalised networks. This was the case in Indonesia, where citizens lost the capacity to negotiate among themselves. Rather, they worked through co-opted proxies and patrons through to the top of the national pyramid.

An example of this problem was seen in the sudden outbreak of regional and communal conflict in the early days of *Reformasi*. Seemingly minor disagreements between people of different backgrounds (be these of religion, ethnicity or province of origin) degenerated large-scale conflicts lasting months or years. Disputes over access to, or compensation for, resources – usually land, tended to be handled the same way. Under the New Order, such problems were settled by violent suppression or intervention by representatives of state agencies. These new conflicts reflected a vacuum in power left by the departure of Soeharto and his networks combined with the lack of trust in or marginalistion of pre-existing means for peaceful resolution.

LEARNING TO NEGOTIATE AS DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS

Another advantage of the reformist or evolutionary path chosen was its reliance on negotiation. Physically locking up, exiling or executing remnants of the old regime allows for faster progress on some issues. However, this approach also opens up new paths to abuse and makes more likely the emergence of a new generation of dictators.

The need to negotiate with elements of the old regime also had a critically important side effect: it provided an opportunity for different factions to work cooperatively toward political solutions. In this, political parties played a crucial role. Aware of the risks of seeming overly authoritarian or too similar to the old regime, politicians did their part to open the political space. At a more basic level, unlike under New Order, no one party could completely dominate the others politically or electorally. To push forward their agendas, parties therefore had an incentive to invite civil society organisations and other groups to exert their influence on the country's political transformation.

However, despite the relative openness of parties in this process, it should be noted that constitutional reform was still very much a backroom negotiation, with minimal opportunity for citizens to exert substantive influence. For example, there was no provision for referenda or other mechanisms of direct democracy in policy-making. It was also a slow and steady process with amendments made in a piecemeal fashion, with one package of reforms agreed during each of the four years between 1999 and 2002.

Notably, from the Left to the Right of Indonesian politics, no significant group questioned or challenged the role of elections as the means to determine the legitimacy to lead. Controversially, I would say the lesson here is that even a history of sham elections contributes to the political culture of a society by establishing the foundation for accepting elections as the way to demonstrate legitimacy to lead; and just as importantly, to transfer leadership.

While Indonesia neither adopted a formal 'national dialogue' format nor established any kind of serious reconciliation process, Indonesians did establish the means through which the citizens learned to influence the policies of the government and elected representatives. This process was not easy. Many mistakes were made; some with tragic consequences.

Emerging and re-emerging political elites, together with other elite components of society, including senior officials and big business leaders, had to learn how to negotiate with and measure public demands. Many chose to do this by either supporting or even founding political parties to promote or defend their interests. The more successful did so by building links to other groups within society including those related to major religious movements, or by claiming a link to older political streams of thinking in society or by courting public endorsement from citizens of repute.

Arguably, the first experience in learning to negotiate with public opinion came within days of the new president's assuming office. An initial announcement that he would serve out the rest of Soeharto's term (until 2003) was met with massive criticism from the press, the demonstrating public and the nascent political opposition. The ensuing response from the president was to declare that early elections would be held by mid-1999, one year after his taking office (and three years early). There was no attempt to violently suppress his opponents, but instead he aimed to 'read' public opinion and respond accordingly.

From this point, President Habibie sought, not to contain, but rather to address the demands of *Reformasi*. His lack of political legitimacy, as a perceived extension of Soeharto, provided him with a need to work twice as hard as others to demonstrate his *Reformasi* credentials.

In this regard, his reform agenda was substantive. In the year leading up to the elections, he and the parliament that, in accord with the spirit of constitutionalism, remained untouched and thus dominated by the same political forces that had happily re-elected Soeharto in March 1998, passed numerous landmark pieces of legislation, each of which represented leaps forward in democratisation. These included legislation on political parties; elections; legislative bodies; decentralisation/regional autonomy; local government financing; the central bank; the civil service; freedom of expression; anti-monopoly protections; human rights; the press; consumer protections; anti-torture; withdrawal of the law on subversion; and ratification of various international conventions, (e.g. against torture; racial discrimination; forced labour, etc.); as well as three laws focused on anti-corruption.

Nonetheless, it should also be noted that each bill had to be negotiated. The parliament would no longer play 'rubber stamp' to the presidency. The following example is illustrative. In the Government's draft law on elections, the electoral system would consist of over 80 per cent single member constituencies, with the remainder allocated by proportional representation, which would be administered by an electoral commission with membership equally weighted between appointees of the Government, participating political parties and civil society. By the end of negotiations with the parliament, the result was the retention of closed-list proportional representation and an electoral commission constituted equally by appointees of the Government and participating political parties.

As a direct witness to these negotiations with the Government's team of officials, it was very revealing to observe the performance of the factions in the parliament, including the Armed Forces Faction. Under the old system, the Armed Forces occupied 15 per cent of seats in parliament (and a similar proportion in all provincial and local councils). While the parties in Parliament argued energetically to remove civil society involvement in the proposed election commission, it was the Armed Forces that advocated for their involvement.

On a number of occasions I noticed that this group, although it had no democratic legitimacy for sitting in parliament, provided a refreshing alternative and objective voice to the emerging political party interests. This was especially true of the negotiations over laws on parties and elections, where parties faced intrinsic conflicts of interests. In those early months, the new parties visibly distanced themselves from the three established parties in parliament, a strategy to mitigate the perception that they were collaborating with a parliament that lacked political credibility and legitimacy.

ARMED FORCES REFORM – NEGOTIATING A WAY OUT

My first rude wake-up call on the realities of democratic transition involving military disengagement from politics came from my first meeting with the leader of the Presidential team drafting the new political laws. In response to a politely worded question on the proposed retention of military representation in the draft political laws, the professor looked at me as if I was a complete fool. He then boomed, "Well, where would you have these thugs, roaming about the streets! Of course they must be engaged in, and responsible for, their own disengagement from the political process".

In an instant, a great deal of ideological clutter about the beauty of civil control over the military was distilled. In that instant; however, it became paramount to consider the sobering consequences of a military deciding unilaterally to evacuate the political space. Basically, if they departed unilaterally, they could later just as easily decide unilaterally to reoccupy that same space.

Negotiations among parties across the political spectrum and the military (both in parliament and beyond) took place, and continue to take place. The process is one of steady agreement on disengagement and regularisation of the role of the military

within the political and governmental spheres through a series of trade-offs and exchanges, including raising official budget allocations in return for greater parliamentary oversight.

The lesson here is that building a genuine consensus on the military departing the political domain has to be seen as a process, not merely as the ultimate end goal. In the case of Indonesia, establishing civilian supremacy was not merely an issue of 'returning the military to the barracks'. The barracks had never been built! The Indonesian military, since the founding of the Republic, had always been an overtly political force. The military's position was built upon the following basis:

Political legitimacy. This included the unchallenged belief that the military played the critical role in preventing the Dutch re-colonising Indonesia after World War II, bolstered by the popularly held view that only the military could hold together an extremely heterogeneous nation like Indonesia and that only it could serve as a bulwark against 'extremist' forces from the Left (Communism) and the Right (Islamic statism). Note well that the military never saw itself as a bastion of secularism. This broad political legitimacy came to be known as the Armed forces' dual function as a military and socio-political force.

Legal and administrative authority. Further legitimising the military's position was the establishment of its legal and legislative roles by the cabinet, parliament, the national bureaucracy, state businesses to local administration with military personnel seconded into each agency and supported by the establishment of a parallel command structure from Jakarta to the villages.

Economic autonomy. Since the days of the revolution, the military enjoyed scant budgetary oversight and considerable opportunities to make money from legal (rent-seeking) and illegitimate business operations (trafficking and smuggling).

Monopoly of state violence. The unchallenged dominion of the military over the use of force by state authorities was further exacerbated by the fact that the national police were subsumed under the direct control of the Armed Forces.

An additional side effect of the powerful role of the military was the militarisation of the state and society. With senior military leaders placed at their top, key national agencies began to develop a military organisational culture. Often times, civilian leaders adopted more militarist tones and perspectives than would be expected even of military leaders.

THE MILITARY AS A FADING FORCE

Interestingly, there was never any attempt during the New Order to operate a system of national military conscription. Military leaders themselves were disinterested in becoming 'child minders to delinquent teenagers', to use an oft-quoted aphorism attributed to senior officers. It is seldom recalled that, late in the New Order era, the military's role in high politics was being pruned back by the President, including a modest scaling down of military appointments to senior civilian positions. Furthermore, the role of the military in the business sector was being undermined due to, among other things, economic deregulation in the late 1980s and the emergence of vertically integrated corporate conglomerates.

One obvious conclusion to reach, yet one rarely considered even today in Indonesia, is that the political power of the military was already on the wane before *Reformasi*. An important lesson here is that the constellation of powers that dominate at the start of an era may be quite different to those at the end. The concentrated power in the hands of the President and his immediate family and coterie of corporate supporters had emerged to be substantial power holders by the end.

However, it is important to note that all of the key architecture (legal, administrative, ideological and historical) that sustained the military's privileged positions in

the state remained fully in place when *Reformasi* began. In addition, the perception by all participants and players in Indonesia at the time was that the military remained the primary power-holder, and all other power-brokers, including President Soeharto and his family, began to diminish in strength and influence.

Surprisingly, it was political parties' openness to the military that enabled parties to assert themselves as the primary vehicles for representation. Rather than attempt to cut off the army entirely and completely eliminate its role in policy-making, parties opened their doors to military leaders. While certain elements in the armed forces may still grumble and desire a larger role in governance, this inclusiveness went far toward pacifying powerful military interests and ensuring that they did not feel excluded from the democratic system. In response, the military has refrained from conspiring against the government, as has been the case in Turkey.

The turning point in the shift from military to civil leadership came in 1999 when, for the first time, the National Assembly appointed the President and Vice President, with no generals standing among the candidates. In 2001, when President Wahid was removed from power, the generals who ran in the subsequent election came last. Later, when direct elections for the President and Vice President were instituted in 2004, former military officials were included in three of the five tickets. However, only retired officers are eligible to run for office, as opposed to the former system, under which sitting members of the army could serve. Today, former army personnel sometimes stand as candidates, but lose as often as they win. In essence, the way Indonesians dealt with the issue was to ensure that generals were free to play politics – but only through the democratic system.

Despite this progress, the transformation is not complete. Armed Forces personnel remain virtually immune to oversight by the Corruption Eradication Commission. Suspicions of military backing of illegal forestry and mining, as well as police facilitation of vice, suggests considerable work still has to be done to uphold the law

Negotiations (between civil and military leaders) on the army's transformation since *Reformasi* produced the following results:

- The police were separated from, and are now independent of, the military, and since the 2002 Bali bombings, the police have taken the lead in enacting counter-terrorism measures;

- Active military personnel no longer occupy elected office. As citizens, they must retire or resign should they wish to seek elected office;

- Placement of Armed Forces personnel in civilian agencies has stopped;

- The Defence Minister is now invariably a civilian position;

- Armed Forces' business holdings are being nationalised;

- The official budgetary allocation for the Armed Forces has risen sharply in recent years as part of efforts to regularise Armed Forces resources, keep them 'on-budget', and therefore render them more open to public oversight;

- The position of Armed Forces Commander rotates between the Army, Navy and Air Force,thus is no longer the monopoly of the Army;

- The resolution of the long-term regional separatist rebellion in Aceh was achieved through civilian-led political negotiations, not just through the military approach; and

- Civilians led the disengagement of Indonesia from East Timor (a region never defined at the birth of Indonesia as part of its sovereign territory).

where these groups are concerned. In addition, the underlying historical legitimacy for Armed Forces' involvement in politics has yet to be debated publicly. For example, a wider appreciation of the role played by Indonesian civilian politicians and diplomats in securing independence has yet to emerge.

In terms of 'holding Indonesia together', perhaps time itself will provide the answer. As the country prospers quietly, the maintenance of territorial integrity without military coercion may lead people to reflect on other factors that work to sustain the Indonesian nation. These include the unifying role of a national language, a relatively cohesive state bureaucracy, relative freedom of commerce across the archipelago, relatively high mobility, and inter-marriage between peoples across the nation. With this wider recognition of unifying factors, the military will be seen as just one among many contributing elements.

Of fundamental interest is the fact that, since the start of *Reformasi*, successive military leaders have worked quietly with, and under, their civilian and elected leaders. Those military leaders who have sought to play a political role have all done so through the democratic process, joining or establishing political parties and winning election through competitive elections. That being said, it is noteworthy that a significant proportion of the electorate continues to believe a military figure is a valuable asset on a presidential ticket (either as President or Vice President). This ongoing perception can be related both to the perceived poor performance of civilian leaders, but also due to the public's ongoing retention of the belief that the Armed Forces is the bastion of national unity.

NEGOTIATING FOR INTEGRITY?

As noted above, the pathway to negotiating reform through constitutional means demonstrated several advantages in Indonesia. However, one of the disadvantages of this approach concerns its effectiveness in building strong systems of integrity.
Arguably, the component of the *Reformasi* agenda most passionately demanded by the populace was to eradicate corruption. Progress in the initial years of *Reformasi* was slow, with obstacles arising at every stage – from the executive to the judicial branches of government to members of the newly empowered legislature, who were becoming increasingly concerned about the implications for themselves. Vigorous and unrelenting pressure from the press and civil society has proven an invaluable source of energy to power through these roadblocks. This also includes an electorate willing to punish parties and candidates seen as falling short on integrity or on their commitment to fighting corruption.

And yet, the explosion of public opposition to corruption at the time of *Reformasi* should never be read as a sudden interest in this problem. According to Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) figures gathered from 1998 to 2011, at the start of *Reformasi*, Indonesia was near the bottom of the global rankings, and indeed in the first year after *Reformasi* began, Indonesia's rating and ranking fell even further. It is not unusual in situations where there is a sudden increase in public transparency and press freedom that people perceive more corruption regardless of the actual reality – talking about corruption increases awareness of its presence.

The lesson for policy makers is to be very careful in reading improvements in *perceptions* of corruption as evidence of improvement in the *reality* of corruption. For example, substantive action to redress corruption, such as public awareness campaigns, may result in citizens becoming better informed about and sensitive to corruption. A liberated press and civil society may then choose to campaign on the 'corruption issue'. Not surprisingly people may start to see corruption everywhere. As a result, the nation's perception of the incidence of corruption may rise and confidence may actually dip.

In the case of Indonesia, after attempting a number of approaches in the first four years of *Reformasi*, a more consolidated and comprehensive approach began when a dedicated Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) was established. Since that time, Indonesia's CPI standing has made steady progress to the point where, in 2011, it was halfway up the global order.

None of this has been easy. While the establishment of a dedicated and centralised agency to attack corruption has become unfashionable in development circles in recent years, the Indonesian KPK is often held up as the exception to the rule. Why is it generally seen to be effective? Among its strengths is its legal mandate. It can both investigate and prosecute cases. It also prosecutes in dedicated special anti-corruption courts. In essence, the Commission actually enjoys considerable authority to act – it is not an impotent show court.

The KPK's founding commissioners also made the constructive choice to concentrate on building coherence and integrity in its internal structures rather than simply pursue the most visible offenders and seek 'quick wins'. The Commission faced intense pressure from political leaders (looking to demonstrate their anti-corruption credentials), from civil society (keen to see big fish fry) and from donors (eager to see action for their investments in support of the Commission). However, by not caving to these pressures and pursuing a longer-term approach, the Commission's investigations were not subverted by internal leaks or other forms of judicial corruption. The lesson here is that the decision of Commissioners to build coherence and integrity controls over time, even at the expense of fast results, was undeniably correct.

A second positive step was a decision of the Commission to build strong networks of support with civil society and the press. This effectively protected the Commission from potential subversion at the hands of its enemies. While no Indonesian would publicly oppose the fight against corruption, privately, the story may be different for some individuals. This is especially the case for those about to face prosecution at the hands of the KPK or those in other law enforcement agencies who may feel threatened by the commission's standing and record. The interests of these groups came together in late 2008 in an attempt to subvert the authority of the Commission through a conspiracy to prosecute two Commissioners on spurious charges brought by the police.

It is likely that this effort would have been successful were it not for a massive series of protests by citizens, 1.5 million of whom signed a Facebook petition in a matter of days. The impact was that the Parliament aborted attempts to 'rein-in' the KPK's authority. Meanwhile, the President set about upending ongoing police investigations against the commissioners, leaving the police and Attorney General's Office scrambling to get themselves out of this self-inflicted predicament. The lesson here is that public support will be critical in facing down the inevitable elite backlash should a Commission demonstrate integrity and effectiveness in prosecuting suspects. Building this kind of public support network is an extremely valuable investment.

From the perspective of the political parties, there has been a strong belief that it would be political suicide to oppose the anti-corruption agenda. Each significant party, including the parties from the New Order era, has sought to position itself as opposed to corruption and where possible, has strived to be seen as effective in preventing or eradicating it. Unfortunately, most have not recognised that corruption is also something that can affect them and their MPs. Integrity systems within parties are very poorly developed. Major problems, such as restricted sources of campaign financing (public funding is minimal) continue to trip up so many political leaders. Their 'scramble' to secure finance campaigns lead many to make unethical deals that too often become front-page scandals and often end up with the political leaders concerned prosecuted for corruption.

It may be that many still mistakenly believe they can 'manage' these problems or negotiate their way out of trouble. The record of the KPK prosecutors suggests this is

a false belief. Another response therefore has been to prune back the authorities of the Commission and the Anti-Corruption Courts either through legislative acts or by promoting sympathetic candidates to sit on the Commission. To date, however, this approach has not proven successful. What has been lacking has been a serious review of the operating environment and the integrity systems in place for parties, with a view to seeing how this can be reformed to reduce the pressures for political activists to engage in unethical and illegal activities.

GETTING WOMEN INTO POWER

One further area where political negotiation has shown mixed results has been in raising women's participation in elected office. The democratic elections in 1999 saw fewer women elected (9 per cent) than in the last pre-democratic election in 1997 (11 per cent). This result energised women's activists to lobby parliament to reform electoral laws with a view to ensuring more women would be elected. Their core approach was to seek quotas for women candidates. The gentlemen of the parliament begrudgingly obliged, agreeing to a voluntary 30 per cent quota for the makeup of party lists. The agreement was not legally binding (there were no sanctions for failing to comply), although notably, most parties did manage to comply.

The way the parties dealt with this edict was by placing women in un-winnable positions towards the bottom of their candidate lists. On the basis of discussions with women MPs, they noted that women who were already well-placed within the party organisational hierarchy were able to secure placement in winnable positions similar to their male counterparts. It was women who were not on party executive boards who were likely to be placed lower than men.

The outcome of these negotiations was hardly impressive. In the 2004 elections, the percentage of women elected merely recovered to 11 per cent. Following renewed lobbying by women's groups, the gentlemen of the parliament added a voluntary placement of at least one woman in each three positions on the party lists. One reason for their agreement was that most parties recognised that they could only expect to win at best two seats per electoral district. Thus, they responded by usually placing women at spot number three – Only 18 per cent of lists were led by women, 35 per cent of second-placed candidates were women and 61 per cent of third-placed candidate were women.

This cosy system was upended, however, when the Constitutional Court declared the partially-closed lists to be unconstitutional, thus forcing fully-open lists. Surprising most pundits and activists, but not this writer, the number of women elected did not fall, but rather rose to 18 per cent as voters demonstrated they were less averse than party leaders to supporting women candidates. Meanwhile, in the fully elected upper house (where individuals – not parties or lists – compete and where the system used is first-four-past-the-post with no quota systems), some 27 per cent of MPs elected were women, including one province where all four elected were women.

These results showed that a proportional system with quotas can pro-duce less elected women than a direct election system without quotas. This challenges standard electoral theory that assumes the opposite would be the case. The lesson here is not to assume approaches that work in some parts of the world will be applicable globally.

In the case of Indonesia, there is a need to look beyond mere legal measures to promote women in politics. This includes a need to redress cultural resistance at the level of the family, whose members may not necessarily oppose women in politics *per se*, but are merely be opposed to women from their own family playing this role. One counter-strategy would be to promote peer-to-peer learning, whereby successful women politicians would mentor younger or more inexperienced colleagues on breaking into politics.

NOT EVERYTHING HAS TO CHANGE

One aspect of Indonesia's political system that has not changed with *Reformasi* has been the capacity of institutions of representation and political leadership – certainly at the national level – to reflect the nation's pluralism. Religious minorities, notably Christians, are, if anything, usually over-represented. Indonesian Cabinets since the founding of the Republic have always included ministers from the country's ethnic and religious minorities. Political 'co-habitation', while a frustration to ideological purists, has deep roots in Indonesia's political culture, regardless of who the President or, in earlier days, the Prime Minister may be. The lesson to consider in other countries is the extent to which a desire for the 'winner to take all' can be tempered by a capacity for elite compromise.

Since *Reformasi*, citizens from one group that while powerful economically, was alienated politically, during the New Order – namely the Sino-Indonesian community – is now also able to participate and win elections as with other citizens. It is important, when reforming a system, to consider what works, not just what does not work. In the case of Indonesia, the geographic character of its pluralism nationally may help to explain its success in retaining its political pluralism – many of Indonesia's ethnic and religious minorities nationally are majorities in certain regions. Although the nature of pluralism varies among nations, the lesson is to consider the fundamental dynamics of, among others, the relationship between demography and geography when considering the potential impact of changes.

CONCLUSION: PARTY DYNAMICS IN TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS

Under an authoritarian regime, the dominant party's programme is nationalised and monolithic with elections symbolically reinforcing the partisan *status quo*. Conversely, in a competitive, multi-party environment, a key factor to parties' success is the extent to which they are rooted in society and able to mobilise voters. Democratic transitions 'liberalise' or even 'privatise' voters by offering them a range of alternatives from which to choose.

However, the nature of political contest among parties during transition is distinctive and not always reflective of the longer-term political or other cleavages within society. The prime motivation of a transition is to cast a verdict on the old regime (ostensibly to vote it out) and fundamentally change long-established systems of governance, not merely to choose a different policy style or leader.

Transition involves a complete overhaul of the political order, not just a shift in voter preferences. The electoral lines along which transitional elections are drawn are therefore different than at any other time. For example, even if the historic division in society was between Islamists and secularists, the choice in a transitional election would shift to a contest between those most opposed to the old regime and a more reactionary (usually older) group who continues to believe the old regime had some merit.

A tendency in the first elections following a transition is for support to swing wildly to the faction that was historically in opposition. In a transitional election, voters are more likely to trust the leader or group that was seen as the most discriminated against or suppressed under the old system. In Indonesia, this role was filled by future President Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). In the Middle East, this role seems to be played primarily by Islamist parties.

What this meant in terms of the practical concerns of organisation and campaigning was that the Megawati and PDI-P were able to capitalise on popular sentiment in a way that other parties could not, because they were clearly perceived as standing against the New Order. Megawati's status as a widely acknowledged victim of the former regime was therefore the most obvious contributor to her party's electoral suc-

cess and enabled her to garner high levels of support even in traditionally Islamist-leaning regions across central and northern Sumatra and in parts of West and East Java.

While Soeharto's former *Golkar* party was not banned and retained its organisational structure, it was forced to swallow a bitter pill, learning how to compete on equal footing with competitor parties while recognising that it would be impossible to win anything approaching its former stake of the vote. No matter what campaign strategy the party adopted, it would be impossible to erase the Soeharto connection in citizens' minds and thus, *Golkar* was destined to take a thrashing at the polls. The best the party could do under these circumstances was to trumpet that it, too, supported *Reformasi*.

Additionally, while the majority of the country was experiencing the devastating effects of the East Asian Financial Crisis, certain areas were left relatively unscathed, including President Habibie's home island of Sulawesi, where a significant population of commodity exporters were actually gaining foreign exchange induced windfalls from the currency's collapse. Here, society was less shaken and elements of the old patronage system remained intact.

This disparity made *Golkar* an easy target for PDI-P to take down. Other parties, be they Islamist or fusion, like Amien Raiss National Mandate Party (PAN) or Abdurrachman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB), faced the more difficult task of carving out a market for themselves based on traditional cleavages, while also proclaiming their vigorous support for *Reformasi* as loudly as possible in recognition that this was the topic of most concern to voters.

However, as in Indonesia, it is to be expected that 'protest votes' for the most visible members of the former opposition will not last. As the emotions of the transition fade and life assumes a more normal rhythm, older political, ideological, or geographic cleavages will re-appear. In the Middle East, Islamic parties have traditionally fared well following transitions, because they are adept at mobilising citizens through an appeal to religious values. They can successfully position themselves as the political movements most likely to ensure there is no return to the old discredited political order, given their victimisation under it.

However, while they may perform well at first, Islamist parties should not become complacent, as their long-term success will depend not on their opposition to the old regime, but on good statecraft. Unfortunately, some of the most inspiring revolutionary leaders are ill-equipped for the everyday tasks of governance and have little experience with the more mundane duties of public administration. In Mexico, for instance, only three years after the deposition of the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI), which for 70 years had ruled under a succession of names, disillusioned citizens were calling for 'the end of rule by incompetents and the return of the corruptors'!

The danger in this circumstance is that the political spectrum will crowd around the poles of left and right, with no effective ballast in the middle. Such polarisation can be destabilising and detract from the quality of negotiation and debate. Unlike in the Middle East and North Africa, in Indonesia, the two major Islamist movements, led by Abdurrachman Wahid and Amien Rais, both determined that there was no need for an Islamist state.

Over the past 40 years a 'Middle Ground' has emerged, comprised of those who believe that religion has a role in the public domain but that it should not hold a monopoly position, and that secular and humanist voices should be heard as well. A clear majority of voters now occupy this wide centre ground. Whereas in the 1950s, approximately 90 per cent of citizens belonged to the extreme left or right, by 2009, only about 35 per cent of the electorate occupied these positions.

This moderating influence was arguably the most positive legacy of Soeharto – and the most important factor in ensuring that a centrist political option could

emerge. The lesson to take away is that party leaders should not rely solely on the anti-regime sentiment of the most vocal element of the electorate to carry them through elections, but should also concentrate on developing a centre position that can bridge traditional divides and thus offer some hope for genuine political stability.

KEY LESSONS FROM INDONESIA: FACTORS TO SUPPORT EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN POST-TRANSITION DEVELOPMENTS

- *1. Have a grounded understanding of the society.*
  The numerous new faces, forces and demands that accompany major political transformation can easily lead to confusion and even bewilderment. It becomes very difficult to build any kind of strategy or direction when everything seems so uncertain. In these circumstances, it is imperative to have a solid and deep understanding of the key historic dynamics that affect the society. . With time, longer-term political divisions within society will re-emerge as key dividing lines. These dividing lines vary between nations and may include socio-economic divisions, positions regarding the role of the dominant faith in the polity, divisions based upon geography/regionalist sentiments, political loyalties based upon appeals to language, ethnicity, religious affiliation, etc. A deep understanding of the society will help differentiate between substantial concerns and inconsequent or transient developments, and will allow you to plan ahead and identify long-term positions.

- *2. Challenge the assumptions of your understanding.*
  When major changes are unfolding, it is critical to recognise the assumptions that underpin your understanding of the society and to be able to adapt to new dynamics. It is prudent to consider carefully just what held the old system together and what then contributed to its fall. This means acknowledging that a long-term regime will evolve over time, as various groups within its power structure attain greater or lesser importance. Assumptions to question might include: What kind of constitutional traditions actually exist in the country's history, as opposed to those commonly believed to exist? What kind of leaders can emerge as opposed to the familiar models people are used to seeing? Be wary of assuming that surface-level political tranquility equates to political stability.

- *3. Recognise both the positive and negative elements of the old system.*
  This calls for intellectual and ideological honesty in identifying what parts of the old system functioned well and should be retained, and how they may be reformed to work better under a new system. In the case of Indonesia, even a history of sham elections helped lay the foundation for popular acceptance that elections are the way to demonstrate a leader's legitimacy and to de-legitimise those that no longer lead. In addition, parties should consider if the political and electoral system tends to exclude certain groups and what combination of systems will mitigate this exclusiveness. Parties should weigh the relative benefits of widening their net of support to new groups against the risk that by trying to do too much, there is a risk of the party losing focus. In Indonesia, representatives of minority groups have always been able to achieve some level of influence. Understanding the links between geography and demography helps explain how this was achieved.

- *4. Negotiate solutions and engage relevant groups.*
  Building a genuine consensus on the military departing the political domain has to be seen as a process, not merely as the ultimate end goal. In the case of Indonesia, establishing civilian supremacy was not merely an issue of the 'returning the military to the barracks'. Deconstructing half a century of history and tradition takes time. More generally, one key condition necessary for the emergence of a more democratic society is the

capacity of citizens and their representatives to learn to negotiate, rather than coerce. It is important that people learn that negotiation and compromise do not betray weakness but are healthy aspects of an open and democratic society where the winners don't take all. Party strategists may well seek to negotiate historic breakthroughs with groups that may traditionally be thought of as their opponents. This can build political gravitas and also weaken opposition to your party.

➡ *5. Attacking corruption involves more than picking the low-hanging fruit.*
The desire for quick action against members of the old regime often emerges as a key demand of aggrieved citizens. Much suppressed passion and anger can be released in the wake of a transition, and the appetite for *ad hoc* or quick responses can come at the expense of long-term improvements. Efforts must be made to ensure that any dedicated anti-corruption units or institutions include integrity systems empowered with the authority to actually act effectively. This requires leaders who are willing to suffer criticism that they are 'not acting fast enough'. These leaders also need to build strong connections and trust with community groups and the press to withstand the inevitable elite backlash, should they begin to succeed in prosecuting the powerful. Key factors to success also include a robust and at relatively independent press, as well as an energised electorate, both willing and able to punish leaders who show a lack of anti-corruption credentials. However, it is important to bear in mind that where corruption is concerned, ironically, the situation can look worst just when substantive improvements have begun to take hold, as reforms will shed greater light on the problem and thereby increase the perception of corruption.

➡ *6. Do not build a platform solely around resistance to the former regime.*
While anti-government sentiment may prove a valuable campaign tool in the first elections following a democratic upheaval, this alone is not enough to ensure lasting political relevance. Ultimately, parties will need to evolve, proving to voters that they have answers to the ever emerging concerns of citizens and are capable of delivering on the tangible priorities of daily life.

"Electoral victory was only the beginning. The transition was not simple... The people had overthrown the dictatorship for a better life, but the arrival of democracy did not automatically bring economic welfare... It soon became apparent that preparing to govern the state after winning the elections is more important than the victory itself. Electoral victory is just the means to get the end of governance."

THE CASE OF SERBIA

Building a political party post-transition

BY BRANIMIR KUZMANOVIĆ

The youth-led Otpor movement that resulted in Slobodan Milošević's downfall in 2000 served as inspiration for protestors across the Middle East in 2011, with several protestors brandishing the Serbian movement's symbol of a clenched fist in Tahrir Square.

However, the Serbian experience also illustrates the challenges of transforming a protest movement into a political party.

Before the downfall of Milošević, Otpor existed as a vast umbrella movement, which needed to 'stay clean' and not sully itself with partisanship. But the ally in the square and on the streets may quickly become tomorrow's opponent on the campaign trail.

The realities of regime change may demand a change in worldview and produce some odd bedfellows.

Branimir Kuzmanović was with the DS from its founding as one faction within a suppressed opposition coalition, through its coming-of-age as an ideologically-focused programmatic party, to its present incarnation as a sophisticated campaign machine.

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN SERBIA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION [1]

1945   Following World War II, Serbia joins Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito.

1980   Tito's death destabilises the fragile coalition uniting the ethnically diverse republics.

1989   Slobodan Milošević is elected President of Serbia.

1991   Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. With a relatively homogenous population of ethnic Slovenes, Slovenia becomes independent after only a short period of fighting. However, with a significant Serb minority, Croatia begins what will be a four-year conflict, evicting the majority of its Serb population in the process.

1992   Macedonia peacefully declares independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most ethnically divided republic, also announces its independence and the country erupts into a war in which thousands will die and over a million will be displaced. Serbia and Montenegro form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

1995   Fighting abates as the Dayton Peace Accords carve Bosnia into three entities, each witha majority of one of the three main ethnic groups – Bosniak, Croat, and Serb. UN sanctions are lifted.

1997   Slobodan Milošević is elected president of Yugoslavia.

1998   The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rebels against Serbian rule and regime forces retaliate with violence. A mass displacement of ethnic Albanians follows.

1999   Milošević's stance on Kosovo occasions NATO air strikes against Serbian targets. Milošević agrees to withdraw forces and Security Council Resolution 1244 places Kosovo under UN rule.

2000   Milošević is accused of rigging the presidential election over Vojislav Koštunica. Mass protests erupt, with activists storming parliament. Milošević is forced to step down and Koštunica is sworn in as president. Yugoslavia joins the United Nations and democratic forces win a landslide victory in parliamentary elections. Zoran Đinđić becomes prime minister.

2001   Milošević is arrested and extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague. Kostunica pulls out of the coalition over tensions with Đinđić

2003   Following the end of his presidential term, Milan Milutinović surrenders to the Hague tribunal. Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić is assassinated in Belgrade. In-conclusive elections open up prolonged coalition negotiations.

2004   DS leader Boris Tadić defeats nationalist Tomislav Nikolić in run-off presidential elections. Tadić pledges to orient Serbia toward EU.

2006   Milošević is found dead in his cell at the Hague. Montenegro declares inde-pendence.

2008   Boris Tadić is re-elected president of Serbia, encouraging the country's pro-EU aspirations. Kosovo declares independence from Serbia.

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1   Partly adapted from the BBC's Serbia timeline. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/5055726.stm Accessed March 2012.

SETTING THE STAGE: RE-INTRODUCING MULTI-PARTY POLITICS IN SERBIA

Every story related to politics is inherently personal; a collection of these personal stories form a collage that depicts the political situation of a country at a particular period of time. This is an account of my personal experience as an observer of – and participant in – the democratic transition in Serbia. While all transitions are unique, my experience may shed light on the choices confronting activists in similar circumstances elsewhere in the world. This case study therefore outlines the steps to be taken in building a political party and successfully contesting elected office following a democratic transition.

In 1990, Yugoslavia, as did all other countries of the eastern bloc, introduced a multi-party system in the wake of decades of Communist rule. However, very much unlike in the Czech Republic, Poland, and other former communist countries, where change came peacefully, the move to multi-party elections was introduced in Serbia at virtually the last moment, when Slobodan Milošević, the president of then-Yugoslavia and of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), was forced to relent under the pressure of democratic developments elsewhere in the region.

Although I had expected to pursue a career in software engineering, when the prospect to participate in multi-party politics arose, as a politically active person and democrat, I felt it necessary to contribute to the downfall of communism in my country. At 21, I immediately became a member of the Democratic Party (DS), which had only just been re-established after a decades-long ban by the Communists.

LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A DEMOCRATIC, COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PARTY

At that time, Serbia had about seven million inhabitants, of whom 350,000 were SPS members inherited from the now-defunct Communist Party. In comparison, our newly formed DS had only 30,000 members. And yet, there were many advocates for human rights and freedom – university professors and public figures – who could be expected to support democratic causes. With the first parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1990, the DS now had the challenge of harnessing this powerful, but politically unfocused energy and contesting the regime's hold on power.

In those early days, our organisation, though it had excellent people in its ranks, had neither many experienced politicians nor enough political knowledge or skill to organise itself effectively. To illustrate our inexperience, at our Executive Committee sessions, some members would ask for the floor 50 times, expecting each time to be allowed to speak because of the democratic principle – that every member should have equal opportunity for voice and influence. Long and unfocused discussions would take place without many conclusions or any minutes taken down from the sessions.

We learned through our mistakes that the sooner you determine rules on how to conduct meetings – who will preside over them; how to reach conclusions; and whom to entrust with moderation, logistics, and minutes-keeping – the better and faster your party will be prepared for future challenges.

Our party, which was not even capable of organising efficient meetings, put many good candidates forward for the 250 contended seats in the parliament, but ultimately won only seven. We learned that having good candidates is never enough; they also need to be presented in the right way. Back then, we lacked even a campaign message.

Ultimately, another national (right-oriented) opposition party won 19 seats, nine mandates went to the national minority parties, and all the remaining mandates were taken by Milošević's party. Our lack of understanding that politics is a skill, not a set of good intentions, enabled the dictator, Milošević, to win elections rightfully. And shortly after his victory, Milošević was to draw the whole region into a succession of wars that would cause suffering to a great number of people.

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPEDIMENTS TO POLITICAL CONTESTATION

The first openly contested local elections were scheduled concurrent with parliamentary elections in December 1992. Since it was the large anti-regime demonstrations of students and citizens that had forced Milošević to call for early elections in the first place, everyone expected democratic forces to win this time.

I personally took part in organising student demonstrations, protests and blockades at Belgrade University. As part of these demonstrations, we organised a large opposition rally at which a representative of the students was to speak. Unsurprisingly, the decision on who would speak for the student population was made in the way students usually do things – at the very last moment. At midnight before the rally, I learned that I had been selected to speak on behalf of the student opposition movement. Standing before 200,000 people and speaking was not something for which I had prepared in my engineering studies, but when my first criticism of Milošević was greeted with a roar of resentment erupting from the crowd, any anxiety about public speaking left me.

And yet, that support can be misleading. When you see a large number of people supporting you in the town and city squares across the country, you may be left with the impression that everybody thinks the same and that the victory is close; that rallies are a sufficient form of communication with the voters. We neglected to appreciate that the regime maintained control of the election machinery, and we overlooked the fact that we had to contend with a full ban on campaigning on all television stations and in 90 per cent of other electronic media (at that time, the internet did not exist as an option to reach people).

One key lesson I took away from this experience was that voters are not only those citizens gathering in city squares or attending opposition gatherings; you have to find a way to reach every voter. If you don't have access to the media, you have to have a sufficient number of people to knock on every door and convey your message.

With total control over all state funds and resources, Milošević's party had a huge advantage. Elections were held according to the principle of proportional representation, and we were defeated again. The Democratic Party won one fewer mandate than in the previous election, attaining only six seats of parliament. From the experience, I learned that control of the election machinery is perhaps the single most important aspect of the election process in developing democracies. Without sufficient oversight, many people will be willing to forge election results. It is therefore critical that each party provide a sufficient number of its own controllers and poll-watchers for every polling station.

MOUNTING A SUCCESSFUL LOCAL CAMPAIGN

Fortunately, local elections resulted in the majority of votes being won by democratic forces in several municipalities – those municipalities where the opposition at least had access to meeting halls to interact with citizens in a normal fashion. This was the first time that opposition councillors were elected in nearly all municipalities and were able to promote positions against Milošević in their communities.

From the experience, we learned that local elections are critical to strengthening a political organization. People want to be personally involved in the elections and they are more willing to join the party if they are able not only to support party leaders but also to stand candidates themselves.

I lost my first elections. Although the SPS was soundly defeated in my municipality in the local elections, I personally lost to another candidate from a bigger opposition party in the second round of elections. I entered the campaign, portraying myself to voters as a student ready to offer new ideas and youthful energy. I canvassed the entire district, going door-to-door and attempting to persuade citizens to vote

for me, 'the student'. I neglected to appreciate the fact that my opposing candidate was also a student. To be very frank, I didn't even check who the opposing candidate was. I learned a valuable lesson that it is crucial to find out everything you can about opposing candidates, rather than concentrating solely on your own campaign angle; ignorance about the opposition can result in selecting the wrong campaign message.

Despite the overall success of opposition parties, the DS failed to perform. In view of the crushing defeat, the majority in the Democratic Party realised that something needed to change. The party became internally fragmented as we deliberated over changes in our leadership. Ultimately, Zoran Đinđić was elected party leader, a man whose energy and vision will create preconditions for Milošević's fall many years later.

This experience is not uncommon. Many parties in young democracies are resistant to changing their leadership despite electoral defeat. However, only parties whose members are ready to give full support to their leadership during elections, but are also ready to change the leadership after a failure, have a chance to succeed in the future.

Only one year later, in 1993, the impact of violent conflicts across the region was felt in Serbia and Milošević was forced to call for new elections – this time with far less control over media. This time, the Democratic Party approached the election process in a much more organised manner. We had a new leader and a clear message of our campaign for the first time. We also collected funds for TV advertisements. Our candidates visited places frequented by people not directly interested in politics (e.g. green markets, stadiums, large concerts) to convey our message to a wider audience.

The new approach paid dividends – we won 29 mandates, with at least one representative elected in every large town in Serbia. We learned that it is essential to have a clear and simple message that can be delivered to voters through all communication channels you have at your disposal. Doing so will give you an advantage over parties that lack preparation or a focused platform. You have to repeat the message consistently, as not everyone will 'hear' it when you convey it for the first time. Moreover, the message should provide citizens with a good picture of what you will do for them after the elections.

Milošević did not win the majority needed to form a government at these elections. However, it wasn't difficult for Milošević to 'buy' the smallest party from the opposition coalition and make a deal with them about forming the government. A few ministerial positions were enough for them to leave the coalition with whom they had gone to the elections. The take-away lesson is that if you join a coalition, try to put in the coalition agreement everything related to the period after the elections. Don't merely let it be just a pre-election coalition that may result in every party going its own way after Election Day. Ensure that the political intentions of all involved in the coalition are clearly stated at the outset.

Political work is difficult to organise in a country with a low standard of living, where people had barely enough money to survive. For that reason, the Democratic Party launched 'Network 20', which focused our work on the 20 biggest cities and towns in Serbia. This doesn't mean that we neglected other places, but due to lack of funds, they had to do the best they could on their own. We invested all resources in having equipped offices in these 20 towns and cities and paid staff to be present in the offices on a daily basis to communicate with citizens. We held regular meetings with local party leaders, as many local politicians didn't even have enough funds for fuel to make regular visits to Belgrade. The key was to devise a strategy according to the funds available. The resources available for any campaign are money, people and time. Use them wisely, without dispersing them all over. Concentrate on what your party can do according to the available resources.

The 1996 local elections were a huge turning point in the political life of Serbia. This time our candidates were ready for the campaign. Parties opposing Milošević's

SPS won in all major cities; however, dictators do not admit easily when they are defeated in elections, even if they are only local ones. Milošević's regime was ready to falsify the election results, but this time we had our controllers who saved copies of the records from the polling stations, thereby verifying the true election results. However, Milošević ordered some of the judges he had under his control to annul the results of the elections and order new voting.

Thus began the longest street demonstrations in the history of Serbia. In the middle of winter, sometimes even at temperatures of 10 degrees below zero centigrade, hundreds of thousands of people protested on the streets of towns and cities where elections had been annulled. Every day, for month after month, they turned out, despite the frigid temperatures or beatings by Milošević's police, to protest against the theft of their votes. And the news of daily demonstrations in Belgrade travelled the world. After 87 days, Milošević was forced to recognise the election results. Zoran Đinđić was elected mayor of Belgrade, and the Democratic Party doubled the number of its members during the demonstrations.

In these local elections I beat my opposing candidates and, for the first time, was elected councillor in Vračar (one of the central municipalities of the capital of Belgrade). This time I checked the opposing candidates, and also used a list of supporters I had made to call them on the Election Day to invite them once more to vote for me. Get-out-the-vote efforts can be decisive in any political campaign. It is not enough for you to gain enough people to support you; you also need to motivate them to go to the polls and not stay home and watch a football game or cook lunch instead. The best methods are direct phone calls to supporters or door-to-door visits. If you have enough resources, you can also organise transport for those voters who cannot come to the polling station on their own.

CHALLENGING THE REGIME AS A COALITION

Out of electoral necessity, a broad coalition was formed before presidential and local elections in 2000, which gathered all non-regime parties under the mantle of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). The only way for us to defeat Milošević was with such a broad coalition that also involved independent unions.

A single candidate who would oppose Milošević in the presidential elections had to be selected. According to the public opinion surveys of the time, the individuals with the greatest chances to win were Vojislav Koštunica (the leader of a small national-oriented party, uncompromised in the public) and Ivan Stambolić (the former president of Serbia). However, Ivan Stambolić disappeared less than two months before the elections. It was only revealed four years later that his assassination had been carried out by members of Milošević's state security force.

Although Zoran Đinđić was the creator of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and the driving force behind it, he did not enjoy universal public support, as the previous regime had run a long campaign of character assassination against him. Vojislav Koštunica had to be chosen. The only aim at that point in time was to win and overthrow Milošević. Since Milošević always had some 300 to 400 thousand votes falsified from Kosovo (Albanians from Kosovo never participated in the elections, but the regime would always falsify election results from Kosovo), that victory was not an easy task at all in the country where around four million people usually vote.

The campaign was focused, clear and simple, and could be boiled down to the Resistance's slogan "He's finished!" We had trained controllers in every polling station, who were given clear instruction to keep the records and report the results to our electoral headquarters. When the results started coming in, it was clear that the slogan was correct. Our candidates won in over 90 per cent of municipalities in Serbia. We published the results through all media we had at our disposal (since we had won local

elections four years before, we had local media at our disposal), while the national television announced results related from the SPS' electoral headquarters in only those smaller places and villages where Milošević won.

The election committee, on which Milošević's party held a majority, announced the 'official' results after four days. They were forced to recognise that the DOS candidate had won a plurality of the vote, but not an outright majority, meaning that the election had to go to a second round, with the top two candidates going head-to-head. The people of Serbia didn't accept that result, and protests and a general strike ensued. A major protest in Belgrade was arranged for 5 October, and DOS arranged for the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people Serbia.

Two days before the scheduled protests, I was arrested by Milošević's police. I spent that decisive day for Serbia in a solitary cell of less than four square meters. I left at home my wife who was pregnant with our first child. I remember hearing the uproar of protesters from the prison and thinking: "God, don't let me out of here if Milošević does not fall down". The next morning I was free again. Protesters broke through all the blockades formed by Milošević's police on the roads to Belgrade. Temporary DOS administration was introduced in all state institutions except the army and the police. Milošević addressed the people from the national television saying that "he was just informed by the court" that the DOS candidate had, in fact, won in the first round. He was finished! Changes could begin.

There is no clear advice to give for victories this big and for essential changes towards democracy in one country. The only clear thing is that it takes years of effort and enormous preparations to strengthen a political organisation and promote opposing ideas before victory can be attained.

TRANSITIONING FROM OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT

Electoral victory was only the beginning. The transition was not simple. Since there was no election for the parliament of Serbia, a transitional government was formed, which still included the SPS. Milošević's state security bodies used this period to remove copious evidence of their actions. In early parliamentary elections in December 2000, the DOS gained a convincing victory with 176 seats, while the SPS won 37. In February 2001, the first democratic government was formed in Serbia since the Second World War, and Zoran Đinđić was elected prime minister.

The people had overthrown the dictatorship for a better life, but the arrival of democracy did not automatically bring economic welfare. The country was faced with major problems, including an out-dated and devastated economy from the 90s. New investments in the Serbian economy were needed from abroad. Numerous laws needed to be changed and legal support for a normal economic system provided. Also, in the domain of social policy, a more equitable distribution had to be established. There was a lot of work to be done. I found my role in the local government in the municipality of Vračar.

It soon became apparent that preparing to govern the state after winning the elections is more important than the victory itself. Electoral victory is just the means to the end of governance. Many parties in young democracies don't think about this. If someone is an excellent activist, it doesn't mean that he has a sufficient expertise or skills and knowledge to be a responsible official in a ministry.

Our victory had its price. The DOS was composed of 18 parties, and agreements on policy and distribution in ministries were problematic. Many ministers had no knowledge or skills to manage their ministries, while other ministries had perhaps the best ministers in the history of Serbia. It was all very incoherent.

The election of Vojislav Koštunica as president also had its impact on developments in the country. He soon began to introduce policies that were very much in the

vein of Milošević's former positions. Although a democrat by orientation, his views regarding the country's foreign policy were similar to Milošević's. An open conflict broke out between the Prime Minister Đinđić and President Koštunica. One segment of Milošević's supporters from the state security apparatus found protection with Koštunica. Organised criminal groups also had their people in the police and state security, and a vested interest not to change anything, essentially, except Milošević himself. Zoran Đinđić thus had several fronts on which to fight at the same time.

With the arrival of large companies ensured, the people lived better and better from one month to the next, but not as well as expected. Constantly maintaining a majority in the parliament among MPs from 17 parties demanded additional time and energy from the Prime Minister Đinđić. Koštunica stepped out of the coalition very soon, and Đinđić was then able to exert political pressure on the Government and put in motion an anti-organised crime law to tackle the criminal groups created during the wars of the 90s, along with several criminalised factions of the armed forces.

Only a few days after the Democratic Party had presented the takeover of administration of army and the implementation of the anti-organised crime law, Zoran Đinđić was assassinated on 12 March 2003.

The number of people who came to Zoran Đinđić's funeral was the largest ever to voluntarily attend a peaceful gathering in Serbia. The popularity he didn't have in his lifetime, Zoran gained upon his death. However, despite the loss of its leader, the Democratic Party found the strength to disband all the remaining units of Slobodan Milošević's loyalists and to fully dissolve the largest criminal clan in the country. Koštunica's party won the elections held near the end of the year, but did not attainthe majority for which they had hoped.

The presidential election of 2004 was decisive for the future of Serbia. The Democratic Party's candidate was Boris Tadić, a new party leader. Surveys showed a slim advantage over the candidate of a conservative-oriented party. Despite a very good campaign, the opposing candidate had a three per cent advantage after the first round of voting. How then were we to reach victory?

In a two-round election cycle, you have to pay attention to those candidates who will not pass to the second round of the elections. You mustn't run afoul of them, because your victory in the second round will depend on capturing some of their voter base. This is exactly how our campaign was designed. With a strategic decision to use all available modes of communication to increase the turnout in those geographic areas where, according to the election results, our voters were in majority, Boris Tadić became the president of Serbia. Serbia at last gained political stability.

A key lesson to take away from this experience is that politicians make a mistake in trying to convert opponents' voters. This task requires too much effort and energy for a very low rate of success, because opponents' voters will hardly ever change their opinion. In a campaign, you should always work in those areas where most of your voters reside. The strategy must always be to increase the turnout in these geographic areas, because that will provide you with an advantage in the number of votes.

In June 2006, in the period between two elections and after five years of managing the municipal board of the Democratic Party, I was elected president of the municipality of Vračar. Finally, I could apply myself the political skills I had long been learning and deploying on behalf of others, but I had only two years to attain success in the next elections. I decide to choose as my campaign associates colleagues who were experienced NDI instructors, and also young people full of energy and desire to prove themselves. I did so because I firmly believe that the only leader is the one who empowers new leaders. You have to form a good team in order to succeed. You should not issue orders to that team, but teach the team members how to make good decisions independently. This is the only way to have successful associates on whom your success will also rest.

THE DS TODAY

Despite our gains, the DS' development as a party is ongoing. We are introducing new channels for communication with voters, whether employing the latest technologies through mobile phone and internet outreach; conducting direct face-to-face activities – unusual for Serbia – including the "Coffee with the president" initiative, whereby every second Saturday, President Tadić holds an informal conversation with citizens in a local café; or bolstering our use of classical communication channels, including direct mailing and personal contact.

Regardless of the medium, the important point is that a quick and clear answer has to be given for every question posed by citizens. Everything is subordinate to support, to the need to uphold the impression that, although the governing authority, we are always subject to our citizens. And this is not a mere political trick; more than 50 per cent of the ideas we have applied in managing the municipality came from the very citizens. When their own ideas come to life, they become our best promoters, and continuous communication with citizens is the only way to maintain the support you need for the success on the next elections.

Though a successful party has to implement a variety of activities, we stay focused on the issues on which we built our party. In our case, there are three core activities: education, improving local communities, and caring for socially vulnerable and special needs populations. In the campaign for the 2008 elections, we used targeted messages for different key demographic groups. The takeaway is to stay focused on your target groups. You don't have to address everybody and waste your energy. Once target groups are identified, only then should you count how many voters you have in these groups and the extent of support you could expect from them. Through this strategy, the list I headed on the local elections won an outright majority – rare for any list in Serbia.

While I'm writing these lines for you, hoping they may be of use to you in your political work, new elections are being prepared in Serbia. Many European countries are facing a major economic crisis, which also reflects on Serbia, and citizens are not satisfied. The DS government is trying to find a way to re-election under very hard conditions. I expect for us to succeed because we are better than our opponents; they anticipate their own success because they believe that we have failed citizens' expectations. No matter what happens, after the long-suffering years under Milošević, we do know one thing above all: there won't be any election violence, war, or conflict. The winning side will have four years to show what it is capable of doing, and the losing side will have a new chance in four-year's time. After a long, and at times painful, transition process, that is a victory in itself.[1]

KEY LESSONS FROM SERBIA ON GROWING A POLITICAL PARTY

➡ *1. Competitive politics is about more than good intentions and inspirational leaders.*
Effective and successful political parties are built on strong organisational foundations. Talented candidates and passion are insufficient to conduct winning campaigns. Establishing clear internal procedures, infrastructure, and strategy are all paramount in the transitional and post-transition phases. Likewise, the party's fortunes should not rest with a single or few figureheads. Party members must be willing to change leaders, should they prove ineffective.

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1   Editors' note: On 6 May, 2012, parliamentary elections saw the Democratic Party losing its plurality within the Serbian parliament to Tomislav Nikolić's Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), formerly a faction of the Serbian Radicals. Nikolić was subsequently elected President of Serbia in a run-off election over DS incumbent Boris Tadić. At the local level, Branimir Kuzmanović held his city representing the Vračar. And Dragan Đilas, for whom he served as campaign manager, retained the mayoralty of Belgrade.

- *2. 'All politics is local'.*
  In a national election, every municipality counts. However, it is critical to be strategic regarding where to concentrate your energy. It is imperative to find a way to reach every voter – not only those supporters that attend major campaign events. *Reach out to rural areas and allow them to be active parts of the campaign.* We needed to have our members in every place and every village in Serbia in order to win the elections against Milošević. To do so, we formed a special team to recruit new membership. In any country, campaigning in rural areas can be quite different than in urban areas. This often requires investing much more time in finding the right people and persuading them to join you. While it takes energy and resources to convince undecided voters to join a political movement or party, once they become members, they can become as valuable activists as those who joined the party on their own. Your organisation should, therefore, establish a recruitment team, as well as a membership service, so as not to neglect members after they have joined the party and to offer them an opportunity to take an active part in its work. Similarly, the importance of get-out-the-vote activities cannot be overstated.

- *3. Where resources are scarce, build on civil society.*
  A young party may not have the capacity to reach an entire populace. Leveraging on sympathetic factions within civil society can expand a party's scope. When I was charged with membership recruitment, a friend, Srdja Popović, one of the founders of the *Otpor* resistance movement, rushed into my office with a small drawing of a fist and said: "You see this fist? This fist will overthrow Milošević". The Resistance was an organisation that didn't have membership cards and typical membership – anyone could become a member of the Resistance." In the lead-up to the elections, the nonpartisan activities of *Otpor* were integral to the DS election campaign. The lesson was that sometimes an NGO can contribute more to your political idea than the party itself. People often have an aversion to politicians, but not to someone who fights for his ideas bravely and nonviolently. In normal situations, various professional associations can be animated, from the Organization of Small Entrepreneurs in a town to the Fishermen's Association. Think before any campaign who with whom you might partner from the NGO sector to achieve common goals.

- *4. Draw on international experience thoughtfully and conduct your own*
  public opinion research.
  In mid-1997, several international NGOs focused on strengthening democracy worldwide came to Serbia, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), and Freedom House, which implemented the country's first training programs in political skills for party activists. I had the privilege to be invited to the first such training in the head office of the DS, where I learned to use the knowledge and skills of other international political parties. Although a campaign manual from Canada or Australia cannot and should not be applied in your country word-for-word, 30 per cent surely can, some 50 per cent could be adjusted to your country's situation, and only 20 per cent remains unused. As I was planning to do a survey among my voters, I came to the training with five short questions prepared, without any introduction or graphics on the paper. I was amazed when I learned that such surveys are done all over the world and that there are clear rules about introduction, graphics, the manner in which to pose questions, how to get information for contacting voters, what to write at the end of a survey, etc. I adapted these practices and applied them in the field. Citizens were thrilled and I got information about what they wanted and made contact with them. I learned to use surveys to stay in touch with voters in between election cycles. Voters will object to politicians who remember them only every four years just before elections.

◗ *5. Choose your allies wisely.*
Serbian party politics has suffered from fractious coalition relations in the post-Milošević period. Coalitions formed and dissolved repeatedly over the decade following the democratic revolution, leading to instability and uncertainty. One should not be *surprised to learn that the allegiances made in opposition can quickly crumble on*ce elected office is openly contested. Even today, as this publication prepares to go to print, negotiations continue on the formation of the next Serbian government as, over a month following elections, the various parties continue to wrangle to determine which former allies in protest turned political rivals will sit together in coalition.

"Democratic transition and subsequent consolidation becomes much easier if there are well-organised political parties that can perform the traditional political party functions of aggregating interests."

THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Developing party politics in a transitional democracy

BY TOM LODGE

The African National Congress (ANC) made the transition from liberation movement into political party and government at the same time as the negotiations that created the new political system in South Africa.

With intense international pressure and moral outrage at the apartheid regime, there was a delicate balance to be struck for the negotiators between compromise and principle. As Tom Lodge describes, that process moved from secret 'talks about talks' to the point at which change became inevitable, but the outcomes remained uncertain.

That the discussions led to one of the most progressive constitutions in the world says much about the political skills of those involved.

Lodge draws both positive and negative lessons from the experience, examining the approach of the ANC – not only how it determined the course of those negotiations, but was itself shaped by the process – highlighting the path to consensus, but also reflecting on the implications of their subsequent dominance of the political system.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS LEADING TO SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

1910   *Act of Union.* From its inception as a unitary state in 1910, white governments ruled South Africa.

1912   *Formation of the African National Congress.* African notables assemble in Bloemfontein decided to organise opposition to the impending Land Act.

1948   *Afrikaner nationalists win power and institute apartheid.* In 1948, the National Party, representing Afrikaans-speaking whites of Dutch descent, formed a government committed to implementing a programme of apartheid that would extend and tighten the existing piecemeal system of racial segregation.

1960   *Suppression of main black political organisations, including African National Congress (ANC).* Banned after nearly fifty years of peaceful opposition to racial discrimination, the ANC reconstituted itself underground and launched a sabotage campaign in 1961. By 1964, most of its leaders were in prison or in exile.

1973   *Mass labour strikes.* These strikes presaged the formation of what would become a powerful African trade union movement. In a key reform, African unions obtained collective bargaining rights in 1981.

1976   *First guerrilla attacks.* From 1976, the ANC, along with allies in the South African Communist Party, began to direct a guerrilla insurgency from its exile headquarters in Lusaka and from military bases in Angola.

1983   'Tri-cameral' reforms and the emergence of the United Democratic Front. From 1983, the Government tried to broaden regime support by enfranchising Indian and 'coloured' minorities in a 'tri-cameral' parliament. The United Democratic Front (UDF) constituted itself and called for a boycott of the new parliament and built an organised following in black townships. UDF leadership included many ANC veterans.

1984   *Rebellion.* A nation-wide insurrection was sparked off by violent protests against rent increases. By the end of the decade, deaths from political conflict peaked at 400 a month. Many of the deaths were the consequence of violence between UDF supporters and followers of the Zulu regional party, *Inkatha*.

1985   *International banks cut credit.* As financial risk perceptions heightened, in 1984 international banks withdrew loan facilities. The United States and various European governments and the European Union imposed (token) economic sanctions from 1987.

1987   *Elections.* In the 1987 elections, the traditionally liberal Progressive Federal Party (PFP) won votes among both English-speaking and Afrikaner whites as a consequence of business disaffection and dislike of conscription.

1988   *Military factions back prompt withdrawal from Namibia.* After prolonged negotiations, a ceasefire was reached in the decades-long border war between South Africa and its allies, on the one side, and Angolan government on the other. With encouragement from the United States and the Soviet Union, a peace settlement with Angola and Namibian independence was secured by 1990.

THE SPARK OF A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

South Africa's progress to a democratic settlement is generally viewed as a particularly successful transition from authoritarian government. The settlement in 1994 ended political violence and established new institutions which have lasted for nearly two decades. This success was partly the outcome of fortuitous conditions – of good luck, even.

I lived and worked in South Africa between 1978 and 2005 as a political scientist at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. In the mid-1980s, even the most optimistic of my colleagues believed that although one day, white minority rule would end, this change was still far off. In fact, by then the process of democratisation was well under way. In this chapter, I discuss the key factors that precipitated the democratic transition, and assess how party politics have developed in its aftermath.

In 1987, unofficial and secret 'talks about talks' began among South African officials and the Lusaka-based ANC leadership. Conversations with the ANC's imprisoned leader, Nelson Mandela, began in 1988. These contacts continued despite disagreements within the ANC and the Communist Party leadership between hard-line insurrectionists and a pro-negotiations group led by Thabo Mbeki.

Then in 1989, there was a change of leadership in the government and within the National Party. President P.W. Botha was replaced by F.W. de Klerk. This reflected a shift in power relations within government, as Botha had close ties with military commanders, whereas de Klerk's power base was within the party organisation. On 2 February 1990, de Klerk announced the release of Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned leaders, and the lifting of bans on the ANC, the South African Communist Party and other prohibited organisations. The government was ready to negotiate.

In the preceding decade, South Africa's rulers alternated in their use of repression on the one hand and political liberalisation on the other. This was deliberate. Policy makers believed that political reforms had to be coupled with exhibitions of armed force. The complexities of this time were very evident in my own experience as a university teacher in Johannesburg. I can remember a particular morning when I visited the eleventh floor of the John Vorster Square police station, where security police were detaining several of our students under the Terrorism Act. We had managed to persuade the police to allow them to write exams and it was time to collect the scripts.

That afternoon, I was invited to speak at a special seminar held on the Wits campus for trade union delegates from the mining industry. However, these were no ordinary bread-and-butter trade unionists. They wanted to know about Polish Solidarity, a movement that was simultaneously a trade union organisation and a political opposition. Among the group I spoke to was Elijah Barayi, who would later become the first president of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). "So", he observed "they are syndicalists then, these Polish comrades. They are using the big strike to overthrow a government. We can do this too".

Why did de Klerk initiate transition? There were several reasons. Among National Party leaders, there was a growing realisation that sanctions and foreign credit restrictions were harming the economy. And while the ANC could be contained militarily, the government had no hope of winning the kind of support from black South Africans that would enable it to rule without coercion.

Also, de Klerk believed that the international climate had changed favourably. The collapse of Communist governments had ended key sources of the ANC's foreign support. De Klerk believed he would be negotiating with a weakened opponent from a position of strength. There was also the government's recent experience of successfully negotiating a socially conservative 'moderate' settlement in Namibia. De Klerk and his cabinet allies were also encouraged by the prospect of assembling a powerful

coalition of white minority parties and black conservative groupings, including the Zulu regionalist *Inkatha* Freedom Party (IFP). In particular, they perceived *Inkatha* as a potentially effective rival to the ANC. This perception influenced their strategic aim of securing a power sharing settlement in which whites would retain a decisive role in government.

Government leaders also knew there was a growing willingness within the ANC to negotiate a political compromise. By 1989, top ANC officials recognised they could not 'escalate' military operations and indeed the ANC was under pressure from its allies in Southern Africa – South Africa had been compelled to move its soldiers out of Angola in 1988. However, just as with de Klerk, the ANC's principals were confident that they would be negotiating from a position of strength. Opinion polls attested to the party's popularity and it could draw upon an impressive organisational infrastructure through its ties with UDF and COSATU. There was also the traditional 'non-racialism' of ANC leadership, an ideological predisposition bolstered through the ANC's alliance with the Communist Party. This sentiment led senior echelons to consider white South Africans as compatriots, not settlers. Finally and very importantly, Nelson Mandela favoured a conciliatory course, and given his moral stature within and outside South Africa, his views were decisive.

President F.W. de Klerk usually receives the credit for his commitment to turning government policy around and he certainly deserved his share of the accolades awarded to South African leaders: he was courageous and he took risks. But several government leaders were ahead of de Klerk in acknowledging that they would have to include the ANC exiles in any settlement. Along with a colleague, I was invited to a meeting in Pretoria in late 1986 with Constitutional Affairs Minister Chris Heunis. Secret emissaries from his office had just returned from Lusaka. He wanted to know more about the backgrounds of the people they had met there at the ANC headquarters. He wanted to know if there was a pro-negotiation group within the ANC leadership. Were there hardliners? Did these distinctions coincide with divisions between left and right, between Communists and 'nationalists?'

These developments enabled an environment in which the negotiations could happen. There were, however, no guarantees of success. The South African 'miracle' was the product of the skills, capacities and predispositions that the main parties in the settlement brought to the negotiations. So, what were the factors that contributed to the settlement?

GETTING TO 'YES': THE INGREDIENTS OF A SETTLEMENT

Timing was important. Reaching a sustainable agreement on all the issues at stake required lengthy bargaining, which at certain moments, would be interrupted by trials of strength between the two main protagonists, the government and the ANC. Formal negotiations, when they began, engaged all political groups who were willing to be involved. Reaching consensus was inevitably a very protracted process.

The fact that, in 1990, there was still a reasonably effective public administration and economy that continued to function in a more or less routine way was also a key pre-requisite for enabling a very long negotiation. So, the first insight that might be helpful to democratic activists reading this essay is that good settlements can take a long time to reach. They are best not hurried – and this needs to be explained to people who might have very good reasons to be impatient.

During the four years of transition, political power shifted decisively to the ANC. De Klerk lost control of sections of security forces that began to play a 'spoiler' role. Paradoxically, the violence resulting from the provocative actions of rogue soldiers weakened rather than strengthened de Klerk's resolve to defend issues which initially were considered by certain National Party leaders as non-negotiable.

'Rewards' for de Klerk's administration and its political supporters were also helpful. These included de Klerk's winning, with Mandela, the Nobel Peace Prize; South African readmission to international sports events; and lifting of sanctions and credit restrictions. It is also likely that National Party successes in recruiting a coloured and black base, as well as consolidating white support encouraged political optimism among party strategists.

In any case, by 1993, on both sides there was a new sense of urgency to reach a settlement and. increasingly competitive violence between black groups, principally between the ANC and *Inkatha*. A second lesson: in a bargained transition from authoritarian rule, incumbents need incentives and rewards to help persuade them to give up office.

Meanwhile, the ANC's predispositions to compromise were certainly strengthened by its success in winning international 'recognition' from conservative Western governments. Inside South Africa, it rapidly constructed an organised mass following, building upon the base structures it inherited from the UDF. Between 1990 and 1994, the ANC demonstrated impressive ability to both mobilise and restrain its own following, repeatedly using 'mass action' as a source of leverage during critical points in negotiations.

Helping its organisational discipline was the 'democratic centralist' ethos it brought back with it from exile, a key borrowing from its long association with the Communist Party. Decisions would be made only after a phase of controlled debate, but once made, decisions were binding on all members. This discipline was decisive in enabling ANC leaders to overcome both elite and rank and file objections to the concessions it offered its adversary, particularly after its decision in 1992 to accept a phase of power-sharing.

The ANC's negotiation skills were derived partly from trade unionist experience of collective bargaining and ex-labour lawyers were conspicuous within its negotiating team. Negotiators on the two main sides could draw upon a battery of constitutional expertise generated by lively debates about different constitutional options during the 1980s. The ambiguous language of the settlement also helped: each side could project its own different interpretations of the settlement in ways that satisfied the expectations of its supporters. Even so, the ANC needed to make a major concession in deciding to moderate its economic plans and drop nationalisation of major industries from its programme.

Another lesson, then, for activists: a negotiated settlement has to offer gains for both sides – and a key "don't" for leaders and their supporters is not to present the settlement as a unmixed triumph for their side.

THE TERMS OF THE 1994 SETTLEMENT

So, what was actually agreed in 1994? First of all, after elections, there would be a power sharing administration in which parties with over five per cent of the vote would govern jointly for the first five years. National Party leaders hoped this power sharing might become permanent. Political parties would be accorded positions in cabinet in proportion to their share of vote. National Party leaders also believed that cabinet would operate through consensus. No civil servants would lose jobs or pensions. Political parties would also share positions in nine new provincial governments. In some of these new sub-national administrations, white and coloured political parties had a prospect of winning the majority share of votes, as did the major ethnically constituted party, the IFP.

The Bill of Rights contained in the 1994 'transitional' constitution would be entrenched in a final draft by the two houses of parliament in the aftermath of the founding election. These rights included the protection of property, an extensive list

of secondary rights as well as traditional civil liberties. Elections were held under national list proportional representation, in which parties would win seats according to their share of the poll. All residents and exiles were entitled to vote and an Independent Electoral Commission organised and evaluated the election. Amnesty was granted for human rights crimes, and the Defence Force and guerrilla armies were combined

CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRATIC GAINS AND STABILISING THE COUNTRY

The 1994 election produced acceptable results for the major protagonists and resulted in a coalition government between the ANC, the NP and *Inkatha*. The ANC won just under two-thirds of the vote. Despite irregularities, the elections were judged free and fair and the results accorded with earlier opinion polling. As president, Mandela placed emphasis on symbolic reconciliation with whites, though the ANC, contrary to the NP's hopes, adopted a domineering position within cabinet. The ANC took care to include whites, Indians and coloured politicians in leadership positions. Successful local government elections were held in 1996.

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1996. Over three years, the TRC determined which individuals would be offered immunity from prosecution in return for full disclosure. Opinion polls suggested that most South Africans considered the outcome fair and that the TRC's treatment of ANC and pro-government groups was even-handed. After the adoption of the final constitution, a new Constitutional Court was established. The Court has been willing to rule against government and is generally still considered to be free from executive interference.

Meanwhile, Nelson Mandela's government built millions of houses and launched poverty alleviation programmes. These only had limited effect, however, because economic growth rose only slowly and unemployment remained high – between 25 and 28 per cent. Partly compensating for the persistence of poverty and sharp social inequality was the expansion of a middle class, as black South Africans took up managerial positions. Generous pension inducements encouraged early retirements from civil service created space for vigorous affirmative action in the bureaucracy.

There were several key factors that helped to explain the success of this transition and the subsequent regime stabilisation. This was a 'pacted' or closely bargained transition – a consequence of deal-making between strong leadership groups with well-organised political support. Comparative experience suggests that these kinds of transitions are most likely to result in stable democracies.[1]

Additionally, in comparison to many developing countries, South African was economically advanced, and had a large middle class, a strong civil society, and a well-institutionalised state. In 1994, South Africa had a 'ready-made' political party system – inherited from white electoral politics and a well organised extra-parliamentary opposition. Finally by 1994 – and in fact well before then – there was general agreement about who belonged to the nation; all South Africans were agreed that they were each other's compatriots and there were no serious secessionist movements. A fourth lesson is therefore that strong leaders make strong settlements; don't completely undermine your opponent.

A final key contributing factor to success was Mandela's own very conspicuous commitment to reconciliation, signalled by such high profile events as the Rugby World Cup, where he appeared during the finals in a Springbok jersey to support an almost all-white team. This commitment of Mandela's was partly prompted by his own moral convictions, but it was also pragmatic. He was very conscious that the settlement was produced through a bargain and that it existed partly because he and his administration were trusted by white South Africans.

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1   See, for example, Karl, T.L. (1990) "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 1.

In 1995, I attended a meeting with Mandela in his offices at the Union Building. It was a special gathering. He had summoned all of South Africa's leading political scientists. After initial courtesies were exchanged, he greeted us all by name without any introduction – he told us why he'd asked us to visit him. The Attorney General (AG) in KwaZulu Natal had just charged a former defence minister, General Magnus Malan, with complicity in the 1987 KwaMakutha massacre. Mandela wanted to stress to us that this was not a political decision, that the AG had acted independently, and that this development was not welcomed by his administration. Indeed, he went to say, he was still deeply worried that the army's loyalty to the new regime should not be taken as a given and that it should certainly not be tested by prosecutions of its former commanders. We could help him, he said, in making sure that this message was understood where it mattered.

IS SOUTH AFRICA BACKSLIDING?

Notwithstanding the positive achievements of the Mandela administration, South African party politics were essentially a one-party dominant system. In the longer-term, might South Africa's one party dominant politics threaten democracy?

As early as the late 1990s, analysts began to suggest that South Africa's politics were becoming authoritarian. Authoritarian dominant party dynamics are signalled in several ways. Unfair electoral competition diminishes prospects of any real electoral challenge. Governing groups treat their parliamentary opponents with disdain. They deny their opponents' legitimacy while simultaneously claiming themselves to embody the nation.

More broadly, they may seek to curtail opposition within civil society. In such settings, opposition remains ineffectual and fragmented. Meanwhile, power and decision-making become more centralised. The party itself stifles its internal democratic procedures. Such regimes use patronage to extend its hold over the civil service, eroding distinctions between party and state. Politically motivated usage of public appointments and public resources then encourages more obvious corruption.[2]

Is this a fair description of developments in South Africa since 1994?

It is true that the ANC has won large majorities in successive elections – 62.65 per cent in 1994, 66.35 in 1999, 69.69 in 2004, and 65.90 in 2009. However, these elections have generally been judged to be free and fair, and it could be argued that they have become more so over time, rather than less.

For example, it has become easier for candidates of all parties to canvass voter support outside the areas where their core supporters reside. In 1994, there were 'no-go' areas in which canvassers from certain parties were forcibly excluded by their competitors' activists and supporters. Such areas were much less extensive in 1999. By 2004, each of the main parties was routinely deploying door-to-door canvassers in the same neighbourhoods – sometimes at the same time.

Over the four elections, electoral management by the Independent Electoral Commission has become more efficient and, in 2009, more than two million new voters were added to the electorate in an especially successful registration drive. All the available evidence suggests that voters are confident about ballot secrecy [3] as well as the integrity of the count; since 1994, the electoral results have never been questioned seriously.[4]

2   Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. (1999) "The dominant party regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A comparative assessment" in Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins, *The Awkward Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy,* (Tafelberg, Cape Town), pp. 1-45.

3   For very positive exit polling findings on the secrecy of the ballot, see O'Donovan, M. (1999) "Election Day Exit Poll", in Yvonne Muthien, *Democracy South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election,* (Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria), p. 37.

4   Afrimap (2006) *South Africa: Democracy and Political Participation,* (London: Open So-ciety Foundation), pp. 98-99.

A fifth insight for activists: do get the elections right – they are the most visible signal of your side's good faith in maintaining the bargain. It helps if your election system, as was the case with South Africa's, is proportionally representative and allows for the prospect of smaller parties joining government.

THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

The 2009 general election appeared to offer fresh prospects to opposition parties. In 2007, the ANC's internal leadership elections had resulted in the replacement of Thabo Mbeki as party leader by his deputy, Jacob Zuma. Mbeki was forced to resign as state president nine months later. Mbeki's deposition was followed by what seemed to be a significant breakaway from the ANC by a faction that formed a new party, the Congress of the People Party (Cope).

Cope initially appeared to garner significant support in the ANC's traditional heartland in the Eastern Cape, taking over whole ANC branches. The prospect of losing support within its political base prompted the ANC to campaign aggressively in certain areas. At mass meetings, speakers from the ruling party suggested that electoral support would be rewarded with grants or other benefits – the implication was that disloyalty would be punished accordingly. Moreover, in the run-up to formal campaigning, observers noted an increased incidence of 'robust' electioneering, including attacks on rival activists, particularly targeting branch leaders of Cope.

In general, though, the weight of the evidence in 2009 suggested that the ANC continued to win its victories mainly through persuasive campaigning rather than as a consequence of coercion, threats or untoward inducements.

So, why is the ANC so successful in winning elections?

One possibility is that South African elections function as a 'racial census'. In other words, voters remain divided by racial divisions and they identify particular parties as representing their own communal interests. This may explain black voters' reluctance to support white-led parties; however, a diversity of black-led parties exist in addition to the ANC. Outside of KwaZulu-Natal, none of these parties has succeeded in winning more than a minority of votes, though Cope's 13 per cent share of the vote in the Eastern Cape did represent an unprecedented electoral shift away from the ANC in its historic base.

Certainly, the ANC benefits from its prestige as the longest established and best organised 'national liberation' movement. But ANC electoral campaigning usually emphasises issues rather than racial identity or historical concerns. ANC campaigns are driven by market research and are very sophisticated. The party is able to spend much larger sums than any of its rivals during elections, for it continues to receive very generous donations both from inside and even outside South Africa. Additionally, to the extent that electoral success still depends upon face-to-face canvassing, the ANC is able to field much larger numbers of canvassers than its competitors. Several analysts attribute the scale of ANC victories to the quality of ANC campaigning, especially with respect to its effect upon a growing segment of undecided voters.[5]

The ANC's campaigning style was set in the first election in 1994, in which it employed the services of American pollster Stanley Greenberg, the architect of Bill Clinton's victory in 1992. I joined a local team of researchers recruited to analyse the data the pollsters collected for Greenberg and, as a consequence, I had an insider's view of some of the planning. Greenberg's advice was that the ANC should stress its vision

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5   ANC campaigning in elections held since 2004 is evaluated in Lodge, T. (1999) *Consolidating Democracy: South Africa's Second Popular Election* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press), Chapters 4-7; Lodge, T. (2005) "The African National Congress: There is No Party Like it; Ayiklo Efana Nayo"" in Jessica Piombo and Lia Nijzink, *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 19-147; Butler, A. "The ANC's National Election Campaign of 2009" in Roger Southall and John Daniel (eds.), *Zunami,* pp. 65-84.

for the future rather than dwelling on the past and that harshly attacking opponents with whom it would have to later co-govern would be illogical. Even Mandela and the other veteran leaders who fronted the campaign had to stick to the script – and for each meeting in each locality there really was a very detailed script – which stressed particular concerns and issues evident from the polling in the area. So for activists, a sixth lesson arising from the South African experience: in a post-conflict setting don't treat your electoral opponent as an enemy and do stress what you want to achieve rather than remind your supporters about past hatreds.

DELIVER DEMOCRACY THROUGH GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

The ANC may find favour with voters as a consequence of its record in government. This is despite the continued existence of very high levels of poverty and rising unemployment. A rising proportion of the population has benefitted from an expanding range of welfare grants and it is likely that these dependent groups are loyal supporters. About 13 million South Africans at present receive such grants. The firmest ANC support is in rural areas, amongst two key groups of such beneficiaries: pensioners and unemployed youth. Others who have been helped by the government include a growing black middle class of civil service managers, officially nurtured through assertive affirmative action.

There is evident dissatisfaction with local government service delivery but angry protests directed at errant ANC municipal councillors have yet to translate into really decisive switches of support to other parties by core ANC voters. Indeed, recent research by Susan Booysen has found that protest tends to be concentrated in vicinities with better than average delivery records, partly as a consequence of the protest itself eliciting improvements in township facilities. As she argues:

> *"Protest in South Africa has overwhelmingly not been used in rejection of (mostly ANC) elected government. Rather, protest has been used to pressurise the elected ANC to do more, to deliver on election promises, to replace local leaders, or as a minimum, it has been used to extract promises and reassurances from ANC government".[6]*

In national elections, protest constituencies continue to deliver high polls for the ANC. In local government, the ANC replaces many of its councillors after a single term – two-thirds of them in 2011. In effect, the party deflects anger arising from disappointed expectations by blaming shortcomings in its performance on lower echelon leadership.

It is worth noting, however, that in every province except for KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC lost votes in 2009. It also received significantly less support than in 2006 at the 2011 local elections. To date, the ANC's alliance with COSATU has held and, in general, government policies with respect to the labour market have responded to trade union concerns. Finally, in the 2009 election, a popular leadership choice probably encouraged turn-out among the ANC's core supporters. Indeed, the way in which a grassroots movement within the ANC secured the victory of its own presidential candidate probably helped to reinforce a tendency for ANC supporters who dislike government policies to continue to try to oppose them within the ANC itself or through its alliance partners, COSATU and the Communist Party.

The electoral record, then, does not support the view that South African politics are becoming more authoritarian. What about the ANC's performance in government? What does this say about the strengthening or weakening of liberal democracy?

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6   Booysen, S. (2011) *The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press) p. 126.

Again the evidence is mixed. Generally speaking, ANC leaders are contemptuously dismissive of the main opposition party. The Democratic Alliance, the heir to a liberal parliamentary tradition that dated back to the formation of the Progressives in 1959, emerged as the major opposition party in the 1999 election, taking over support from the National Party. The NP lost credibility as a consequence of its ineffectualness as the government's junior coalition partner. It withdrew from the coalition mid-term and F.W. de Klerk resigned as party leader, both developments that weakened it further. After the 2004 election the NP dissolved and its remaining leaders joined the ANC. When the DA won the Western Cape provincial election in 2009, it displaced an ANC administration.

In 2009, local ANC spokesmen reacted to the DA's victory with ill grace, warning their followers that the new provincial government was led by racists and calling upon their followers to make the region "ungovernable".[7] Youth Leaguers in certain localities seem to have understood this call as a licence to organise systematic vandalism of public facilities installed by the new provincial administration.[8] However, ANC leaders' treatment of some of the other smaller parties has been more considerate: Thabo Mbeki included people from other groups in both his cabinets, a practice that Jacob Zuma maintained with his appointment of the all-white Freedom Front's Pieter Mulder to the Agriculture portfolio.

Of course, inclusion in coalitions may help to inhibit smaller parties from playing an effective oversight role in parliament. Certain ANC parliamentarians have paid penalties for their efforts to hold to account the executive branch of government. For example, an arms deal scandal would test the government's respect for judicial autonomy and President Mbeki's resignation from the presidency in 2008 followed Judge's Chris Nicholson's censure of the pressure Mbeki exerted on the National Prosecutor's Office.

ANC politicians do react angrily to media criticism and they appear to be convinced that the mainstream 'commercial' press is ideologically hostile and still largely controlled by 'white' business. New legislation for the Protection of Information threatens to extend the scope of official secrecy in such a way that newspapers might risk heavy penalties if they investigate venal politicians. The law is now under scrutiny at the Constitutional Court. In the end after various revisions, ANC drafters were able to overcome objections to earlier versions within its own parliamentary caucus. Earlier drafts of the Bill did arouse extensive protest including opposition from key trade unionists and key ANC notables. Indeed, the ANC's Pallo Jordan criticised the Bill as the expression of a 'fool's errand', asking the question, "How did the ANC paint itself in a corner where it can be portrayed as being opposed to press freedom"?[9]

THE STAIN OF CORRUPTION

An additional source of sensitivity for the ANC leadership with respect to corruption issues has been the party's reliance on bribes from prospective contractors as a source of election campaign funding, at least in 1999.[10] The ANC now has its own investment corporation, Chancellor House, which in 2010 obtained five mineral prospecting licenses from the Department of Mineral Resources. As well as making its own investments, Chancellor House now supplies the major channel for corporate contributions to the ANC.

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7   Daniel, J. and Southall R (2009), "The National and Provincial Electoral Outcomes", in Southall and Daniel, *Zunami* (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). p. 269.

8   Underhill, G. (2010) "ANCYL admits role in Cape protest", *Mail and Guardian*, 19 November.

9   Benjamin, C. (2010) "Media gag's a fool's errand – Jordan", *Business Day*, 23 No-vember.

10   Feinstein, A. (2009) *After the Party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa's Uncertain Future* (London: Verso), p. 158. For details of the activities of ANC-linked companies and the donations the ANC received from various Black Empowerment concerns see Paton, C. (2007) "Financing the ANC: Untold Millions", *Financial Mail*, 19 January.

Official corruption in South Africa has remained at middling levels with respect to international comparisons through the last decade, though South Africa's ranking in Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has fallen from 38th in 2001 to 64th in 2011. CPI ratings over the years do not suggest that the extent and depth of corruption in South African has altered significantly: the rating has hovered around 4.1, a borderline rating in a scale in which 10 represents "highly clean" and 0 is "highly corrupt".

In 2006, the International Crime Victim Survey included South Africa in a study of 13 African countries. Respondents were asked whether they had been asked by public officials for a bribe during the previous year. Around a third of respondents had been asked for bribes in Uganda, Mozambique and Nigeria. The frequencies of such experiences were lowest in Botswana (0.8 per cent) and in South Africa (2.9 per cent).[11] This kind of evidence indicates that petty corruption is far from routine in South Africa's public administration.

Press reportage of corruption emphasises venal behaviour by elected officials who control tendering at all levels of government. In 2007, surveys of companies suggested that about a third expected to bribe officials to secure contracts, only slightly lower than the Sub-Saharan African average.[12] In 2009, the Auditor General reported that 2000 civil servants who held private interests had engaged in tender abuse. In 2007, 40 per cent of the ANC's MPs listed interests as company directors.[13]

HOPEFUL SIGNS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

These discouraging developments are offset to an extent by the strengthening of the main opposition party, more visible commitment to parliamentary oversight among certain ANC backbenchers as well as the endurance within the ANC of an assertive rank and file.

In the last general election, the Democratic Alliance obtained nearly 3 million votes, nearly 17 per cent of the total ballot and 67 out of the 136 opposition sets in parliament. It performed better still in the 2011 local elections, obtaining 24 per cent of the vote overall. More generally, opposition has consolidated into three main parties, the DA, Cope and the IFP with the other parties obtaining progressively smaller vote shares in successive elections. Though the DA has invested effort in trying to recruit black members and establish African township branches the 2009 election results confirmed it had yet to win serious numbers of African votes even in the Western Cape where it emerged as the most popular party among coloured voters. DA officials themselves acknowledge that they have yet to take votes from the ANC and that so far their gains have been at the expense of smaller parties.

A succession of local reports since the last general election of ANC activists forcibly closing down DA meetings may represent a reversal of previous trends towards a free environment for party competition. In its local settings, ANC activism is increasingly organised by the Youth League, a much better resourced and more locally assertive organisation than was the case a few years ago.

Whereas the ANC's local organisers were often people with trade union experience with consequent training in democratic procedures this today is less likely. Typically, today's grassroots activists are very young, politically inexperienced and often very aggressive to opponents. In the Western Cape Youth Leaguers have earned rebukes from their own party's provincial leadership for their intemperate language and vola-

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11   C M B Naude, Johann Prinsloo and Anastasios Ladikos, *Experiences of Crime in Thirteen African Countries: Results from the International Crime Victim Survey,* Electronic Publication, UNICRI-UNODOC, 2006, pp. 37-39; Mark Orkin, *Victims of Crime Survey, Statistics South Africa*, Pretoria, 1998.

12   World Bank-International Finance Corporation (2008), *South Africa: Country Profile, 2007* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), p. 9.

13   Paton, C. (2007) "ANC and Business: Soul for Sale", *Financial Mail*, 19 January, p. 27.

tile behaviour. Such censure has limited effect; the Youth League has its own business interests and with financial independence can risk displeasing the ANC's elders. This year, the national executive finally decided to expel the Youth League's president, Julius Malema, finding fault not so much with his racist demagoguery directed at whites but rather with his criticisms of the Botswana government as a pro-Western 'puppet regime'.

With respect to parliament, after the advent of Jacob Zuma's government in 2009, the Standing Committee of Public Accounts became much more assertive in exercising oversight, insisting that cabinet ministers appear before it and subjecting them to tough questioning. This welcome development followed sharp criticism by a specially appointed independent panel of SCOPA's deference to the executive during the arms contract investigation. In November 2010, however, several of the ANC's more assertive portfolio committee chairs were replaced in a reshuffle of parliamentary posts with more compliant figures holding more junior status in the party hierarchy.

The third positive trend has been the continuing vigour of the ANC's own internal life. In dominant party systems, the ruling party's internal procedures tend to become sclerotic. A range of fieldwork-based studies conducted between 2003 and 2007 attested to the ANC's retention of an active membership structure organised into lively branches.[14] These studies were undertaken around Johannesburg and may not have been altogether representative.

The ANC's own internal documents suggest that the quality of branch life is very uneven. For example, the 2010 Secretary General's report noted a 125,000 increase in membership since 2007 – it is now around 750,000 – but conceded that membership tends to fluctuate, expanding before elective conferences and declining thereafter. Most of the new members were recruited in one province, Kwa-Zulu Natal, mainly in territory previously closed off to the ANC by *Inkatha* supporters. Nationally, since 2007, the number of branches "in good standing" had declined and all too often, as in Limpopo Province "general membership is not involved in activities" and "there is minimal contact between branches and the communities they are located in". In general, the report acknowledged "there was a decline in consciousness among the general membership and frequently people were joining the organisation principally because they wanted to access resources".[15]

From a broader perspective, and more positively, trade unions continue to exercise influence over policy makers, sometimes in the wider public interest as with their opposition to the Protection of Information Bill. Jacob Zuma's own accession to the party leadership in 2007 confirmed, of course, that rank and file membership can challenge and displace party leaders. The ANC elects or re-elects its leadership at party Congresses held at five year intervals. The 2007 election was the first time since the 1950s that an incumbent president was displaced.

Thabo Mbeki's defeat was the consequence of several factors. As Mandela's deputy and as state president from 1999, he was widely perceived to be the architect of liberal economic policies disliked by ANC trade unionists and was blamed for high unemployment. This might have mattered less if Mbeki had not centralised policy-making so much within the presidential office, insulating decisions from the influence of the ANC's national executive. His aloof managerial style helped to compound his unpopularity.

Finally, from 1998, the ANC embraced a strategy of political patronage in which leadership deployed party loyalists into key positions in the bureaucracy and in para-

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14 Beresford, A. (2009) "Comrades back on track: the durability of the Tripartite Alliance", *African Affairs*, Vol. 108, No. 432; Darracq, V. (2008) "The ANC organization at the grassroots", *African Affairs,* Vol. 107, No. 429; Gunner, L. (2008) "Jacob Zuma, the social body and the unruly power of song", *African Affairs,* Vol. 108, No. 430; Lodge, T. (2004) "The ANC and the development of party politics in South Africa", J*ournal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 42, No. 2, Lodge, T. (2006) "The Future of South Africa's party system", *Journal of Democracy, 17, 3.*

15 Quotations from Mantashe, G. (2010) *Report on the State of the Organisation by the ANC Secretary General, ANC Website.*

statal corporations. Simultaneously it also began using government contracting and licensing to promote black-owned business. As a consequence at each of the three levels of government – national, provincial and local – holding political office enabled individuals to become very wealthy. Sometimes they used their wealth and influence to build their own personal followings within the party organisation, especially within provincial governments. Deployment and patronage opened up the scope for personalised networks of power within the ANC and competition for office and positions within the organisation became increasingly factional. Personal rivalries helped to complicate as well as intensify ideological tensions within the organisation and between it and its allies.

Jacob Zuma's accession was supported by trade unions, a section of the leadership of the Communist Party, whose 100,000 membership overlaps with the ANC's much larger following, and the ANC Youth League. Since Zuma's election to the state presidency, perceived Mbeki loyalists have lost positions on boards and have been 'redeployed' away from key posts within the civil service.

Internal ANC politics remains very divisive. In 2012, the ANC is once again holding leadership elections. At present, the main trade union leaders fall into two camps: a group that favours Zuma's re-election and a group that favours his replacement by his deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe. Trade unionists that support a more abrupt nationalisation of the mining industry as well as land expropriation without compensation belong to the pro-change group. Zuma can count on the support of public sector worker unions whose jobs have been better protected whereas the radicals are concentrated in the traditionally militant industrial unions that have lost members through factory closures.

Meanwhile the Youth League looks likely to oppose Zuma's re-election: it too favours land expropriation. Though trade unionists are often conspicuous within the Communist Party, for the time being key Communist officials remain in the Zuma group. Communists comprise about half of Zuma's cabinet appointments.

The evidence does not show a clear movement towards authoritarian politics. South African voters continue to accord support to an effective parliamentary opposition in free and fair elections. Yes, there is disturbing evidence of autocratic inclinations among ANC leaders and far too much venality among senior office holders is unchecked, but day-to-day public administration remains fairly honest. ANC parliamentarians occasionally challenge members of the government and the party's organisation, and the party's allies have the capacity to check domineering leaders.

A final lesson, particularly for readers in other settings who face the prospect of dominant one-party politics, is that an electoral outcome that leaves one party with an unassailable majority may not necessarily bring about democratic decline. It might – as arguably has been the case in South Africa – allow for a period of stability during which new institutions become entrenched and in which politicians and their parties begin to internalise and commit themselves to democratic norms and procedures. They won't do this by themselves: they will still need plenty of help, support, encouragement and pressure from pro-democracy activists.

KEY LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

- *1. Transition is a slow process and laying the groundwork early is essential.*
  Quite a lengthy period of political liberalisation *before* the transition began in 1990 made South African democratisation much easier. The government's decision to accord legal recognition to black trade unions in 1981 was especially important, because it had unintended consequences. Government hope to 'co-opt' or incorporate black labour, which helped sustain political mobilisation. Liberalisation was important for other reasons, as well. The Government's own commitment in the early 1980s to a measure of con-

stitutional change – stopping well short of full democratisation – helped to encourage debates about different constitutional models. This mean that when the negotiations began, many participants had well-developed proposals and carefully thought-out bargaining positions. The first lesson, then, is that democratic transition is much less challenging if it is preceded by an extensive phase of partial liberalisation.

- *2. Good settlements are generated by lengthy negotiations.*
South Africa's settlement was a long procedure, partly because many parties were engaged in the negotiations, but mainly because the distance the two main protagonists had to travel from their respective starting points was lengthy. Both the NP and the ANC needed time to recognise what was achievable in their own initial agenda and what was not. They needed time to test each other's resolve – and to develop lasting relationships between the members of each team. This is often best handled out of the public eye in technical committees tasked with particular issues. Time was also needed for the many parties to coalesce into broader groups.

- *3. Negotiated settlements are compromises.*
Compromises are easier to achieve if the key parties in a conflict recognise that they lack the capacity to win and that in prolonging the conflict, they might impose too heavy costs on their own supporters. But if the compromises are to be defensible politically, followers need to be convinced of their necessity. Charismatic leaders are often indispensable for this task: Mandela's post-transition commitment to reconciliation demonstrated keen awareness of the contractual nature of the settlement.

- *4. Well organised political parties.*
Democratic transition and subsequent consolidation becomes much easier if there are well organised political parties that can perform the traditional political party functions of aggregating interests. In this, South Africa was fortunate, in that in 1989, the key political actors led organisations that in certain cases had histories stretching back decades.

"The nature of political party representation changes under democratic conditions. Political parties will play a vital role not just in how those expectations are managed, but also in educating citizens as to their role in political life. Whereas under authoritarian regimes, the political sphere is confined and restricted to the elites, in a democracy, the ownership of problems and solutions has to be conceived much more broadly."

CONCLUSION ON PARTIES IN TRANSITIONAL STATES

*Changing the relationship between people
and power in the Arab world*

BY GREG POWER

The case studies in this volume provide a deliberately personal per-spective on the challenges faced by political parties, and describe the role of parties in the process of transition and consolidation.

Literature tends to emphasise the unique functions played by politi-cal parties in articulating and aggregating public demands, develop-ing alternative visions and policies for governing the state, and testing the public support for those policies in elections. Political parties thus provide a choice to voters, a means of selecting political leaders, and a mechanism for holding the government to account.

But, underpinning all of these is a more fundamental role. The task of political parties in new democracies is to change the relationship between people and power.

The shift from an authoritarian regime to a democracy fundamen-tally alters the way in which power is conceived and used. The revo-lutionary movements in the Arab world were the result of multiple frustrations about the arbitrary use of power. Democracy offers the prospect of political influence, choice, voice and accountability.

That transition should mean that the public perception of politics shifts – from something that happens to you, to something over which you have some control.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN NEW DEMOCRACIES

The tasks are manifold. Political parties are the key mediating bodies in this process of change. Their effectiveness will go some way to determining the success and durability of the new political system. As the principal vehicles through which voters make their views known and their voices heard, parties need to be responsive to citizens, rooted in communities, capable of translating what they hear into meaningful policies, and have some realistic prospect of delivering on their promises. Yet they must also lead and shape public opinion. Expectations in new democracies are inevitably high; the challenge for political parties in this context is to manage those expectations, and focus on what is achievable. Emphasising that change is very likely to be slow, incremental, and piecemeal is unlikely to win many votes; however, political parties will play a crucial role in shaping citizens' perceptions of democracy and establishing the cornerstones of the new political culture.

These deeper, more abstract principles need to be balanced with the far more pressing and practical challenges faced by all political parties in transition. The phase between the overthrow of the previous regime and the first set of democratic elections contains numerous sets of intense pressures and limited time. The tasks of finding premises, recruiting staff, attracting members, creating databases, securing funding and establishing internal structures occur at the same time that parties need to be thinking about campaigning, policy development, promotion and outreach. And, parties also need to be able to find candidates that agree with the central policies and who can serve as reliable representatives of the political party.

The case studies touch on just some of these initial problems, and emphasise how widespread such challenges are. However, the main focus of the publication has been on the longer-term questions that parties need to resolve. For some time, international democratic support was based on the assumption that the first set of elections ushered in the era of democracy. Events in the last decade have illustrated that these initial elections often only mark the beginning of a long and difficult path. The case studies therefore aimed to show the longer-term strategic challenges for political parties in the transition and consolidation phases, and the consequences for the stability of the political system, public faith and the performance of democracy in delivering for voters.

This final chapter suggests that four main themes can de divined from the case studies. The first is the critical challenge of defining the distinctiveness of the political party in the public mind, through the prism of identity, ideology and policy. The second is how political parties relate to one another and engage in multi-party dialogue, which in turn determines the robustness of the overall political system. The third is negotiating with the military about the scope and use of democratic power. And the fourth is the subsequent forms of representation and delivery – how do political parties convince their voters that democracy is working?

THE POLITICS OF ORGANISATION, IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY

During the summer of 2011, one Egyptian political activist told the authors that it seemed every significant figure in Cairo was intent on establishing his or her own political party, commenting that, "at this rate, every voter will soon have their own personal party". This proliferation of new political parties is often a feature in the period between uprising and elections, as citizens adapt to the new political landscape and seek to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the franchise. Electoral realities invariably mean that the parties start to collaborate and coalesce, and eventually combine to form blocs around points of common agreement, thus presenting a broader front to voters, and increasing their chances of election. But the process is often drawn out and difficult.

Most parties in the Arab world appear to have emerged from one of four sources.

First, there are those that evolve out of civil or protest movements, which include the various youth movements that were at the core of the uprising in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the scores of ideological parties based on the left or right of the political spectrum. Second, there are the liberal parties that played some opposition role under the authoritarian system of government, but may have a long political history in each of the countries. Third, there are the remnants of the previous regime itself, the previously dominant party, which will inevitably seek to retain some influence, but reinvent itself for the new political situation. And, fourth, there are the Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party or the Salafist *Al-Nour.*

The key task for all of them during that period is finding a constituency of support within the electorate, creating a membership, and rooting the party more firmly in society. This means identifying policies that resonate with voters, and defining themselves in the public consciousness around key points of identity or ideology. Although each of the four groups of parties starts at varied levels of development and has very different trajectories, each will grapple with three sets of problems.

In the first place, there is the principal challenge of organisation. The transition from an authoritarian system to democracy will mean that parties need to develop their structures, constitution and programme, as well as undertake necessary procedures for formally registering the political party, such as gaining the requisite number of supporters across the country.

Second, there are what Jeroen De Zeeuw has described as 'attitudinal changes'. No matter the history of the party, it is likely to have to alter its approach to policy-making and political strategy to the new situation. The basis on which opposition movements seek to challenge an authoritarian regime is fundamentally different to the approach of a political party that has a realistic chance of wielding some political power. The latter entails adapting strategies, tactics and goals within a policy framework.

Third, there is the question of how these policies are conveyed to the public, that is to say that basing a strategy on the key characteristics that define and distinguish them from their competitors.

The extent of each of these challenges varies among the four types of parties outlined above. At one end, the Islamist parties in newly democratising Arab nations are in the best position to contest elections, with robust organisational structures and networks developed from their work at the local level, and a very strong sense of organisational purpose built up over decades. Their success to date has been testament to both their organisational strength, and distinct message. However, there is a continuing challenge for the religious parties to distinguish themselves from one another over points of difference.

Although liberal secular parties have played some role under previous regimes, they appear to be suffering from that history rather than benefiting from it. As Marina Ottoway and Amr Hamzawy have argued, in a publication that predates the Arab uprisings, although these elements shape public debates on social and cultural matters, they are weak in terms of vision, message and organisation.[1] They struggled to define a distinctive role for themselves prior to the uprisings, and they – alongside the remnants of the old guard - now appear tainted by their participation in the previous political system.

In contrast, a multitude of newer political parties have faced the dual problem of creating an organisation out of nothing, and competing for voters' attention in an extremely over-crowded market. For the newer parties in particular, developing a distinctive and coherent ideology is all the more important, for internal as well as exter-

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1   Ottoway, M., & Hamzawy, A., (2009), *Getting to Pluralism: Political Actors in the Arab World,* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p. 67.

nal reasons. Although external differentiation is key; internally, political parties in new democracies will depend to a large extent on the willingness of supporters to give up their time for a particular cause, and the party needs to provide them with some sense of mission and purpose. A powerful system of values within a party is also likely to provide the bonds between party members and politicians necessary to prevent fragmentation and factionalisation. Without these defining beliefs, there is very little to stop politicians frequently switching parties in the quest for personal gain.

That said, the fragmentation and re-ordering of political parties is likely to continue for some time after the first set of elections, as the political system embeds itself. The greater concern is how, as electoral competition intensifies, political parties seek to distinguish themselves. There is often an assumption, especially amongst donor agencies from Europe and North America eager to support the process of democratisation, that party systems will inevitably fall into some sort of left-right spectrum. In practice, the way in which voters in new democracies see themselves has less to do with socialism or capitalism than with other sources of identity, such as religion, race, tribe, region or sect. Political parties tend to evolve around these sorts of cleavages, as the most obvious points for representation.

In the Arab world, many of the autocratic ruling strategies sought actively to suppress such forms of identity. It is therefore unsurprising that, under a new political system, they start to manifest themselves - if not in the shape of specific political parties, then in specific policies that seek to appeal to certain groups. There is therefore a dangerous potential for the new system to heighten divisions rather than easing them. The challenge for the political parties is to manage these tensions in a way that accommodates and accepts differences, rather than exacerbating them, which goes to the heart of the way in which political parties engage with one another.

OVERCOMING ANTAGONISM – INTER-PARTY DIALOGUE IN THE ARAB WORLD

The need for inter-party dialogue and engagement in transitional states is arguably greatest at the very moment when parties are least suited to conducting it. The months immediately following the overthrow of the previous regime require concerted negotiation between the political parties over the shape of the constitution and the allocation of powers between organs of the state. Political parties should be the principal vehicles for conducting this discussion, reflecting the interests of different sections of society in those negotiations.

Yet, aside from the practical problems of party development outlined above, there is very little common basis on which the political parties can build. The key political players are likely to be unfamiliar with one another, and a limited democratic culture or few norms governing such interaction, the period is frequently marked by distrust and uncertainty about others' motives. The low levels of trust mean that negotiations can resemble a zero-sum game, in which any win for one political party must inevitably result in the loss for another. Such an atmosphere is not conducive to constructive political debate.

In the Arab countries, such uncertainty and distrust is partly a legacy of the previous regimes, which emphasised the divisions amongst the political movements, and which frequently sought to undermine public confidence in certain political actors by targeting and demonising them. Although every country in the region has its own particular history, there are, generally, three elements to this ruling strategy, first, 'managed reform'; second, suppression of political society; and third, the absence of any concept of a 'loyal opposition'.

First, the ability of ruling monarchs or presidents across the region to hang on to power for so long has been ascribed to a strategy of 'managed reform'. In other words, in an effort to secure the legitimacy of the regime, its leaders would engage in a pro-

cess of gradual political liberalisation, whose pace and content is determined by the ruling autocracy. This would often involve institutional reform and the impression of political change, but without the transfer of any substantial power. It was thus an exercise in top-down management characterised by 'guided pluralism, controlled elections and selective repression'.[2] Countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Yemen, were regarded as 'liberalising autocracies' which were, "liberal in the sense that their leaders not only tolerate but promote a measure of political openness … but they are autocratic in that their rulers always retain the upper hand … with their ultimate reliance on the supreme authority of the monarch or president, liberalised autocracies provide a kind of virtual democracy".[3]

The events in these countries throughout 2011 and 2012 emphasise the idiosyncrasies of those regimes, and the limited capacity of the strategies to manage change. But the key point for all was that political participation was only possible within distinct limits set by the rulers.

Second, that strategy of managed reform also depended on an active manipulation of either the system or the political actors, or both. In many countries, the institution of political parties were either rendered entirely illegal or else certain political parties were banned, for example on the basis that they were religious parties – as has been the case in an obvious attempt to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood. Where political parties were active the electoral system was frequently manipulated in order to ensure that the regime always enjoyed a majority in parliament. This was reinforced by a strategy of dividing any nascent opposition at an early stage, either by providing certain sections of society with favourable policies or by directly bribing independent and opposition politicians to secure their vote. In short, the political and parliamentary dynamics were poorly developed. Where parliamentary blocs did exist, they lacked the discipline and cohesion to organise the parliament effectively. As Daniel Brumberg notes, the survival strategies for auto-cratic rulers were designed to prevent the emergence of any effective political society, allowing them to split the opposition, and undermine the effectiveness of the political parties as a whole.

Third, the strategy also prevented any conception of 'loyal opposition'. In many states it was, and still is common, for the ruling King or President to be regarded as synonymous with the nation. Therefore, it was not possible to oppose the government, or its policies, without being regarded as against the nation itself. Rulers actively encouraged such perceptions by demonising particular politicians, activists and parties. Under such circumstances, the liberal and secular political parties found it hard to present a nuanced opposition to the governing authorities and were frequently accused of co-option. This meant that the only meaningful opposition came from outside the political system, usually in the shape of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who were portrayed as a danger to the nation's stability.

Unsurprisingly, given this context, relations between political parties after the various uprisings were weak. And, suspicions about the motives of the various political parties were reinforced by the various roles they played in the overthrow of the previous regime. In Egypt, for example, the absence of the Muslim Brotherhood during the revolution was regarded as evidence of its collusion with the armed forces, the liberal parties were often regarded as having been co-opted by the previous regime, and the newer parties were seen as unknown revolutionaries.

The functioning of the political system depends on each of the political parties recognising that although they may have fundamentally divergent views about how the nation should progress, this difference is the basis of democracy. The responsibility for emphasising this lies with parties themselves. As Tom Lodge states in his chap-

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2   Brumberg, D. (2002) "Democratization in the Arab World: The Trap of Liberalised Autocracy", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13. No.4, P. 56.

3   Brumberg, D. (2003) "Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform", Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 37 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), P. 3.

ter on South Africa, there is little advantage in treating your electoral opponents as enemies; instead, parties should stress what they want to achieve, rather than remind supporters about past hatreds.

The stability of the system will depend on the degree to which those parties previously regarded as enemies of the state are absorbed. Authoritarian regimes accord legitimacy to political actors based on the extent to which they agree with the regime. Under democracy, that legitimacy comes from the willingness of the public to vote for parties. It is in the interests of all the political parties to accept and encourage that division, but create a political system for managing those differences within parliament. In short, the notion that you can be loyal to the nation, but fundamentally disagree with the policies of the government should be a cornerstone of the new political settlement.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE MILITARY

The third theme emerging from each of the case studies is the role of the political parties in negotiating the space within which party politics is conducted. The political settlements in Latin America, Turkey, Indonesia and South Africa were developed with the outgoing regimes. In his chapter, Tom Lodge emphasises the importance of lengthy and protracted discussions with the apartheid regime in order to secure the stability of the new politics in South Africa.

But it is the role played by Indonesian and Turkish political parties in coping with the continuing influence of the military, and its negotiating its departure from the political sphere, that provide the best illustration of a successful strategy for navigating some of the challenges for the process of transition in Egypt.

The role of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) was pivotal to the toppling of President Mubarak and central to the management of the Egyptian transition subsequently. In January 2011, it was the army's unwillingness to suppress the original protests in Tahrir Square and its withdrawal of support from Mubarak that made his departure inevitable. The fact that the military was able to ensure a relatively peaceful transfer of power meant that its popularity in the early part of 2011 was high. However, their handling of the transition since then has meant that the military has, in turn, become the focus of both protestors' and politicians' ire. Most of the media coverage since the ouster has concentrated on the running battles between the army and protestors in and around Tahrir Square. But still more significant is the deeper political struggle going on between the political parties and the SCAF, particularly since parliamentary elections in early 2012 crystallised the shape of the political forces in Egypt. Those tussles turn on key constitutional issues, such as the relative powers of parliament and president, the process for the constitutional assembly, the legitimacy of presidential candidates, and critically, the role and status of the military in any new constitution.

The development and survival of democratic party politics in transitional states depends on the way in which the military's role is diminished. However, experience shows that it is a protracted process, fraught with difficulties, which continues well after the first democratic elections. Although there are many similarities in the experience of transitional states, we can identify three principal challenges that are pertinent to the Egyptian experience.

First, is the extensive reach of the military's economic and political interests throughout the state. The army has had a role in the government of Egypt since the military coup in 1952, with all presidents since coming from within its ranks. Over that period, the army has diversified its economic interests from those directly relevant to the armed forces to a range of activities, including bottling mineral water, transportation, tourism and construction. At the same time, retired generals and officers hold a

range of positions within government ministries and provincial authorities.

Second, the extent to which the military's interests are deeply intertwined with those of the state means that the SCAF appears to regard its own interests as synonymous with those of the nation as a whole. An International Crisis Group (ICG) report from April 2012 stated that the SCAF considers itself the only actor possessing "the experience, maturity and wisdom necessary to protect the country from domestic and external threats. In contrast, virtually all political parties are regarded with scorn, self-centred in their demands, narrow-minded in their behaviour".[4] In short, the army view appears to owe much from the previous regime, with the armed forces retaining the ultimate responsibility for ensuring stability.

Third, although the SCAF seeks to retain this power to secure peace and stability, it does not appear to want to take public responsibility for governing, and thus risk being held culpable for any shortcomings. Since the revolution, the SCAF has therefore sought to manipulate various aspects of the transition such as the parliamentary and presidential elections, in an effort to reduce the impact on its own authority. In its most extreme form, this trend has manifested itself the SCAF's attempts to place itself beyond the reach of the constitution, and not subject to oversight or accountability, particularly for its business interests. It aspires to "somehow both remain in the background and [act as] an arbitrator; shun the limelight yet retain influence".[5]

Events during 2011 and 2012 suggest that this is not a viable long-term strategy, as the SCAF was forced to back away from successive attempts to manipulate the system, and give in to the demands of protestors and politicians. The military's role needs to change in order for party politics to flourish, but also for the position of the military as well. A huge amount of literature exists on the way in which this has happened in other transitional states, but there are in general terms, two phases to this.

First, there is the political challenge of establishing a new constitutional configuration that removes the army from the political sphere. Yet the military themselves need to be willing partners in that process. As Kevin Evans noted of Indonesia, the army needs to be responsible for its own disengagement from the political process. It should, ultimately, provide some legitimacy for the new political order. The second challenge is creating a democratic culture wherein those constitutional roles are visible and accepted. Suat Kiniklioğlu described the way in which the AKP sought to navigate the deep state and continued military interference. Again, we see that the armed forces have to believe that it is not in their interests to be seen to be involved.

The lessons for political parties in negotiating this process appear to be twofold. First, strategically, the armed forces need a new sense of purpose that focuses outwards, rather than inwards. Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work on the 'third wave' of democratisation suggests that this has to concentrate on building a professional military ethic which recognises the limited functions of the military that are compatible with civilian control. Emphasising the centrality of military missions, removing internal security functions, and highlighting the need for the armed forces to concentrate on external threats or even international peace-keeping were all part of this process. At the same time, the task was to slowly increase political oversight of their budgets, functions and activities.

Second, achieving such objectives means providing the military with incentives for them to be willing partners in the process. At the most basic level, according the military sufficient status, honour and income are all part of the equation. The difficulty is, of course, that the military in Egypt is responsible for managing the very system from which it has historically benefited. Although the military may fear letting go of power, attempting to hold on to it in the face of increased political resistance will only continue to undermine their already waning authority. The task for parties is to

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4   International Crisis Group, (2012) *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF*, MENA Report No. 121.
5   Ibid, p. 17.

both challenge and reassure the armed forces in order to secure their agreement. As Tom Lodge argues, there is no merit in entirely undermining your opponents during negotiations – strong leaders make for strong settlements. The SCAF could still be the ultimate guarantor of a new constitution, provided the parties can negotiate agreement around the space in which they operate.

NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION AND DELIVERY

The final challenge highlighted by the various case studies is the extent to which political parties need to manage the expectations of the new regime. Inevitably, the new political order has to cope with huge public assumptions about the pace and content of change, which will always struggle to be met. The experience of countries in transition in Latin America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe is that a period of mass disillusion and disenchantment follows the initial regime change, reflecting a growing realisation that democracy will not solve the major economic and social problems confronting those countries. At this point, the perceived legitimacy of democracy is frequently low. This period often occurs before the democratic culture and norms of political life have firmly established themselves, and marks the juncture at which the country is most vulnerable to a return to military or authoritarian rule.

If countries come through this period, though, public opinion tends to solidify around the merits of democracy as more desirable than any other form of government. Political parties play a critical role in this process of managing expectations of the new system, creating a democratic culture and shaping the public's understanding. The transition in the Arab world is still at a very early stage, but there are three sets of factors over which the parties have a direct influence and which may affect the legitimacy and public perception of the new democracies.

First, in Egypt in particular, there is an ongoing struggle as to who owns the revolution. This is evidenced by the fact that those who were at the forefront of the protests were not those who reaped the benefits during the parliamentary elections. As mentioned above, the Muslim Brotherhood were noticeably absent during the protests, but were the big winners at the polls. That concern about the dominance of the Islamist parties most graphically illustrated itself in the debates about the composition of the constitutional convention which, following the results of the elections, gave most of the positions to representatives or supporters of those parties. The subsequent resignation of most of the secular members of the convention meant that it was incapable of operating, and in April 2012, the process was disbanded with proposals for an alternative published in early May.

The disruption reflects the fact that in the early phases of any transition, the fiercest arguments tend to be the ones about process and structure, especially when they are perceived to benefit one political party or bloc over others.

Second is the need to understand and where possible meet the material needs of voters. It is a truism that politicians campaign in poetry, but govern in prose: whereas the overthrow of an authoritarian regime tends to be won on the basis of high political and constitutional principle, government is about detail and delivery. As Suat Kiniklioğlu noted in his chapter on Turkey, the expectations of democracy were brought into a focus by a voter whose principal concern was not high politics, but the repair of a dilapidated wall near his home. Although the political parties and protest movements want to rearrange the architecture of the state, once elected, they also have to be concerned with the ensuring those new mechanisms deliver for voters. As one Egyptian voter commented to the authors, 'when the economy is not working, people don't care about the ideology'.

Third, and related to the above points, there is the responsibility of moving from opposing a sitting regime to governing. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, one

of the key tasks for political parties is to adapt strategies, tactics and, sometimes, goals to the new political landscape. For the Muslim Brotherhood, whose motto has been 'participation not domination', this is particularly acute. Whereas the Brotherhood's strategy was developed under political systems designed to prevent it from winning any sort of influence, the creation of democratic elections has meant that, in the words of Nathan Brown, victory has become an option.[6]

The strategy that saw the Brothers develop comprehensive local services and support for individuals was one suited to opposition. The requirements for governing mean that the organisation will face increased pressures and expectations to deliver more broadly. While the movement's local services filled a gap left by the state, the expectation of voters is likely to be that the Brotherhood ensures that such shortfalls no longer exist. In other words, the Brotherhood must move from service delivery at the local to the national level; that it must shift from the specific to the strategic.

But, perhaps more pertinently, the task of governance means taking responsibility for the performance of the state. Whereas in opposition, it is relatively easy to hold on to your principles, governing involves compromises, and an inevitable fall in popularity follows, as voters become disillusioned with parties. As the economist J.K. Galbraith noted when advising President Kennedy, "politics is not the art of the possible; it's about choosing between the unpalatable and the disastrous".

In short, the critical message is that the nature of political party representation changes under democratic conditions. Political parties will play a vital role not just in how those expectations are managed, but also in educating citizens as to their role in political life. Whereas under authoritarian regimes, the political sphere is confined and restricted to the elites, in a democracy, the ownership of problems and solutions has to be conceived much more broadly. It will be the proximity of the political parties to their voters and parties' sensitivity to citizens' concerns that will determine how those problems are resolved and understood, and whether anti-system forces can emerge as viable alternatives.

CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEOPLE AND POWER

Adam Pzreworski memorably described the process of democratisation as one of institutionalising uncertainty. The overthrow of an authoritarian regime, and the creation of new forms of representation and participation, presents huge opportunities for influence. They also mean that many of the previously held certainties no longer apply. Political parties are one of the principal ways for managing this uncertainty, by providing the means for absorbing and articulating public concerns in alternative policy visions.

The performance and effectiveness of the political parties will therefore go some way to determining the attitudes of the public to the new system, for good or ill. The health of democracy in a particular country is often intrinsically linked to the state of the political parties. As one author speaking in the African context has noted, "While political parties are a critical asset to a vibrant, dynamic and thriving democracy, they also have a great potential to become a democratic liability".[7] Or, as a senior figure in democracy support has noted, when countries experience political crisis, it is often the troubled state of political parties that lies at the heart of the problem.[8]

Yet, the challenges for political parties in the early months and years of democracy are particularly acute as they struggle with issues of building their own internal

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6   Brown, (2012), *When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success*, (Washington: Carnege Endowment for International Peace).

7   Matlosa, K., (2005) *Political Parties and Democratisation in the Southern African Development Community Region: The Weakest Link* (Johannesburg: EISA), p. 47.

8   Doherty, I., (2001) "Democracy out of balance: Civil society can't replace political parties", *Policy Review,* No. 106, p. 29.

organisation, developing policy, engaging with the public and, potentially, taking a role in government. However, a vital aspect of the process is recognising that parties alone cannot offer solutions to all the problems faced by the nation. As stressed at various points throughout this conclusion, political parties need to be responsive to public opinion, but they also need to lead and shape people's expectations.

As Samuel Huntington has argued, "What determines whether or not new democracies survive ... is the way in which political leaders respond to their inability to solve the problems facing the country ... Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily anything else".[9]

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9   Huntington, S., (1993) *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 259 & 263

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Dr. Arriagada has served as minister of the presidency of Chile, Chile's ambassador to the U.S., chairman of the board of Radio Cooperativa, and director of the "NO" campaign, which defeated Pinochet in Chile's 1988 plebiscite. Dr. Arriagada served as ambassador-at-large and special envoy of the president of Chile to the Second Summit of the Americas, and was head of Ricardo Lagos' and Eduardo Frei's presidential campaigns. Currently, he is a member of the board of Universidad de las Américas, senior advisor to the president of the Club de Madrid, editor of www.asuntospublicos. org, and non-resident senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue. He was previously a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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Kevin Evans has been a student of contemporary Asian developments for 30 years and has been working the region for over 20 years. He has professional experiences in the fields of diplomacy, academia, development and governance reform support, civil society activism and merchant banking. He advised the Indonesian Government as it developed its decentralisation and wider political and constitutional reform agenda from the late 1990s. Mr. Evans has worked professionally on governance reform and post-conflict/disaster management issues since 1998, primarily with the UNDP, involving advisory and programme development and implementation experiences in Afghanistan, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Turkey.

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Suat Kiniklioğlu has been a member of the Justice and Development Party's Central Executive Committee since 2009 and is Director of the Center for Strategic Communication. He served as member of Parliament from 2007 to 2011, was AKP Deputy Chairman of External Affairs, spokesperson for the Turkish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chair of the Turkey-U.S. Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group. He is a columnist for Today's Zaman, an English-language daily and frequent contributor to international media outlets. He founded the Ankara Center for Turkish Policy Studies, served as editor of the English-language quarterly journal Insight Turkey, and following a transatlantic fellowship at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, became founding director of the German Marshall Fund office in Ankara.

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Branimir Kuzmanović joined the Democratic Party (DS) in 1990, when it was re-established after a decades-long ban. Mr. Kuzmanović was one of the co-founders of the party's youth wing and, following his mentor, Zoran Đinđić, helped lead the student protests against the government of Slobodan Milošević. Following Serbia's transition, Mr. Kuzmanović has continuously held elected office as representative for the Belgrade municipality of Vraçar and was campaign manager for the mayor of Belgrade, Dragan Đilas in the recent elections. He also serves as a senior regional political party trainer with the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

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